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UNTOLD STORIES: RESTORING NARRATIVE TO
PLEADING PRACTICE
Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R. Falk*
One of the oldest stories known to the common law lies buried
in the terms "pleading" and "complaint": the plaintiff complains of
ill-treatment at the defendant's hands and pleads for relief.' In-
deed, in medieval English courts, plaintiffs were required to plead
their case (pro se or through a "pleader") by way of detailed oral
statement called "narratio" in Latin, translated as "tale" in Eng-
lish.2 Over the centuries, this narrative aspect of the complaint,
the telling of plaintiffs tale through substantive allegations, 3 has
been eclipsed by the several instrumental functions of complaints
even as those functions-invoking the court's jurisdiction, provid-
ing notice to the defendant, narrowing the issues, uncovering
facts-have themselves waxed and waned in importance. In
mainstream modern pleading practice, storytelling tends to be
seen either as inimical to effective pleading or as applied decora-
* Elizabeth Fajans, Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School.
Mary R. Falk, Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. The Authors
are grateful for the suggestions of friends and colleagues: Stacy Caplow, Ruth Anne Rob-
bins, and Marilyn Walter. We also want to thank our research assistants, Naree Sinthu-
sek and Jared Goodman, and as ever, Rose Patti, our assistant.
1. The complaint is not the only pleading document, of course. Though we focus on
the complaint in this Article because it contains the central narrative of a civil action,
there are other places for stories: affirmative defenses, cross-claims, counterclaims, and
third-party complaints. Some states permit or even require defendants to tell their story
in the answer. See e.g. Mich. Ct. R. 2.11 1(D) (requiring "the substance of the matters on
which the pleader will rely to support the denial").
2. Frederick Pollock & Frederick William Maitland, The History of English Law
Before the Time of Edward I, vol. II, 605 (S.F.C. Milsom ed., 2d ed., Cambridge U. Press
1989) (originally published 1895). It was not sufficient, for example, to allege that defen-
dant owed plaintiff money and had not repaid it; plaintiff was required to tell "how on a
certain day came this William to this Alan and asked for a loan of fifty marks, how the
loan was made and was to have been repaid on a certain day, and how, despite frequent
requests, William has refused and still refuses to pay it." Id.
3. Our concern in this Article is uniquely with the drafting of substantive allegations,
not with allegations of subject matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, venue, or
damages, the drafting of which is extensively covered elsewhere. See e.g. Roger S. Hay-
dock et al., Fundamentals of Pretrial Litigation (2d ed., West Publg. 1992).
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tion, rhetorical adornment to be reserved for compelling cases.4
But we think that this creates a false choice for practitioners and
teachers alike, and that when narrative is seen as inherent in
pleading, new methods of drafting and teaching follow. In short,
the more useful question is not whether to tell a story, but how to
tell it. Complaints are not any less the narrative because they
succeed or fail within a web of conventional, statutory, and tactic-
al constraints.
In this Article, we argue that practitioners whose skills do
not go beyond bare-bones form-book pleading risk disserving their
clients, because legal readers, judges included, are as responsive
to the call of stories as other readers.5 Part I provides an over-
view of the evolution of pleading practice and the relation of
pleading and narrative, concluding that even in courts and claims
where such minimal pleading is permitted-fewer today than the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might have in-
tended 6 -the writer would do well to meld the skills of a storytel-
ler with the skills of a tactician, balancing the instrumental and
rhetorical functions of complaints. Part II gives an overview of
basic narrative theory and narrative techniques and suggests how
those techniques apply to complaint drafting. In particular, we
discuss how storytelling techniques like character development,
plot sequence, and detail can contribute to the creation of a com-
plaint that has "narrative rationality." Such a complaint tells a
familiar "stock story" from the canon of legally cognizable wrongs,
comports with the known facts, and provides a meaningful trans-
lation of the plaintiffs experience, evoking in the reader a desire
that justice be done. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for teach-
ing ourselves to draft complaints that use narrative techniques to
advance the client's cause while remaining true to the client's ex-
perience.
4. Infra text accompanying nn. 34-55.
5. Some lawyers "argue that stories are fine for an argument to the jury, but mis-
placed in a pleading .... But they must stop and ask: Are judges any less interested than
juries in the larger questions? And are juries more likely than judges to base their deci-
sions on empathy? The available evidence suggests the answers to both questions is in the
negative." Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 792 (1995).
6. Infra text accompanying nn. 14-28.
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I. THE STORY OF PLEADINGS
The story of pleading practice from the common law to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its many
state analogues is a straightforward one complete with villains,
victims, a hero, and a happy ending. At common law, every cog-
nizable civil wrong was a separate "form of action" with its own
intricate procedure. 7 The slightest misstep in pleading could
leave the plaintiff on the courthouse steps. In mid-nineteenth-
century America, this "cumbersome system of specialized allega-
tion"8 was supplanted by "fact" pleading, which granted access to
the court by way of a generic civil "complaint" that typically con-
tained only a "statement of the facts constituting the cause of ac-
tion, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in
such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended."9 Despite such plainly democratic rhetor-
ic, fact pleading did not in fact open the courthouse doors much
wider. Only "ultimate facts" could make out a cause of action;
"evidentiary facts" and "conclusions of law," were not acceptable.
The result was "a new quagmire of unresolvable disputes"'10 as to
whether allegations were indeed ultimate facts.11 In the middle of
the twentieth century, "notice" pleading rode into town, rescuing
litigants from "the hypertechnical categorization of fact pleading
under the codes and the sluggish formalism of common-law plead-
ing."12 As typified by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, notice pleading only requires that a complaint provide a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
7. See generally F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of
Lectures (A.H. Chaytor & J.W. Whittaker eds., Cambridge U. Press 1958).
8. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 555 (2002).
9. Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521 (known as the "Field
Code" after its drafter).
10. See Fairman, supra n. 8, at 555.
11. Evidentiary facts, ultimate facts, and conclusions of law can be defined with decep-
tive ease by way of example. One commonly employed example explains that "the roads
were icy" is an evidentiary fact, "driving too fast for conditions" is an ultimate fact, and
"breached his duty of care" is a conclusion of law. E.g. Mary Barnard Ray & Barbara Cox,
Beyond the Basics: A Text for Advanced Legal Writing 263-264 (2d ed., West Group 2003).
The real problem is that the categories in fact have no fixed boundaries; rather, a spec-
trum of infinite points runs from the plainest evidentiary fact to the baldest conclusion of
law. See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 5, §
1202 (3d ed., West 2004).
12. See Fairman, supra n. 8, at 551.
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is entitled to relief."13 In the words of the Supreme Court in Con-
ley v. Gibson,'4 this was famously interpreted to mean that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim un-
less it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."'15
Rule 8 not only radically simplified the complaint-drafting
process, but also deemphasized pleading itself. At common law
and under fact-pleading codes, the back-and-forth of pleading, the
thrusting and parrying factual allegations of plaintiff and defen-
dant in complaint, answer, reply, and beyond, served several pur-
poses in addition to notice: narrowing the issues, uncovering
facts, and revealing and disposing of meritless claims.16 These
purposes were reassigned under the Rules, largely to the discov-
ery and summary judgment processes.
That Rule 8 had a salutary door-opening effect is exemplified
by Conley itself, where African-American railroad employees al-
leging discriminatory discharge were permitted to bring their
grievances to the federal courts despite what would have been
insurmountable obstacles under fact pleading. Yet despite such
happy endings and the broader and easier access to justice that
notice pleading promises, the subsequent plot-line is unclear, with
several threads to follow, all of them suggesting that good lawyers
need to learn artful pleading.
First, notice pleading has not entirely triumphed; a sizeable
minority of states, including Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and
Oregon,' 7 retain some form of fact pleading, thus requiring more
skill and care on the complaint drafter's part.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The basic rules governing the drafting of pleadings are
contained in Rules 7 through 14. Rule 9 requires that fraud and mistake be pleaded "with
particularity" and specifically permits "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
a person's mind" to be pleaded "generally"; Rule 10(b) provides that "[a] party must state
its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a
single set of circumstances."
14. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
15. Id. at 45-46; but see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-557, 563,
570 (2007) (characterizing the language of Conley as "an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard" and requiring a complaint to allege facts sufficient to show a
"plausible" claim for relief, not merely a "conceivable" claim).
16. See Fairman, supra n. 8, at 556.
17. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2); La. Code Civ. P. 891; Mich. Ct. R. 2.111(B)(1); Or. R.
Civ. P. 13(A), 18(A).
[Vol. 15
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Second, notice pleading has given rise to a seeming backlash
in the form of "heightened" pleading requirements imposed by
Congress and by the federal courts. 18 Despite two rebukes by the
Supreme Court, 19 some federal courts require plaintiffs in civil
rights actions to plead with particularity matters ordinarily
beyond the plaintiffs' knowledge. 20 A federal statute similarly
requires plaintiffs in private securities fraud litigation to plead
with particularity allegations concerning misleading statements
and allegations concerning defendant's state of mind, both very
tall orders.21 Heightened pleading requirements, often "targeted"
to a particular element of a claim or particular factual context,
have also been applied by some courts to anti-trust and CERCLA
actions and to claims of civil conspiracy, defamation, and even
negligence. 22 Some federal courts have even subscribed to the
maxim, mind-boggling in a post-Conley and Leatherman age, that
"[d]ismissal of a complaint for failure to state facts supporting
each of the elements of such a claim is, of course, proper."23 These
heightened pleading requirements have been attributed to judi-
18. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Ariz. L.
Rev. 987, 988 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 1749 (1998); see also Fairman, supra n. 8, at 567. Despite its recent retreat
from the broad language of Conley in Twombly, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was
not applying a "heightened" pleading standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14.
19. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (holding that an em-
ployment discrimination complaint need not contain specific facts making out a prima
facie case); Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (holding that federal courts may not apply "heightened pleading stan-
dards" in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
(reaffirming that Swierkiewicz rejected a requirement of "heightened pleading" for Title
VII cases).
20. See Fairman, supra n. 8, at 583-587.
21. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, codified in pertinent part at
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (Westlaw current through P.L. 111-4 (excluding P.L. 111-3) ap-
proved 2-11-09). Should defendant move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the statute
further provides that discovery will be stayed during the pendency of the motion. Id. at §
78u-4(b)(3)(B).
22. Fairman, supra n. 18, at 1011-1059. In one recent high-profile case alleging that a
fast-food restaurant chain knowingly sold unhealthy food that promoted childhood obesity,
the complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with heightened pleading requirements.
See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court was
motivated to require heightened pleading by its concern that 'McLawsuits" would prolife-
rate, creating "crushing exposure to liability." Id. at 518; see also Christopher M. Fairman,
No Mc Justice for the Fat Kids, Leg. Times 42 (Feb. 17, 2003).
23. Iodice v. U.S., 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002); see e.g. Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing lodice).
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cial and legislative perceptions that certain categories of claims
are frivolous, vexatious, and expensive time-wasters to be discou-
raged. 24
Third, there is resistance to minimalist one-form-fits-all
pleading from a radically different quarter: practitioners and
teachers who believe that such a practice often poorly represents
clients' interests and some who believe, further, that it shows dis-
respect for the clients themselves and for their stories. 25 Rote,
generic pleadings "do not translate [plaintiffs'] stories in the full-
ness of their drama. Nor do they persuade with the full force of
their potential. ' 26 Certainly, the drafters of Rule 8 did not intend
to prohibit or even discourage fuller pleading. The Rule was in-
tended to "liberate lawyers from code pleading. It is not intended
to restrict how they may choose to plead."27 Indeed, the drafters
of Rule 8 "did not favor bare-bones complaints."28 The "global vi-
sion" of the drafters of the Rules was that "litigants should have
their day in court."29 That means making access easier, of course,
but surely, it also means ensuring that a litigant's story is heard,
24. See Fairman, supra n. 8, at 617.
25. See e.g. Bill Bystrynski, Drafting Complaints, Tr. Briefs 6 (Apr. 1999) ("[The com-
plaint can be a time to put your best foot forward, to draft the document a judge will look
at first to get a sense of your case. The drafting of your complaint can be one of the impor-
tant times for gathering the relevant facts and applicable theories together."); Eastman,
supra n. 5, at 765-768 (expressing "frustration and disappointment" with traditional
pleadings in civil rights cases, his own included, "sterile recitations of dates and events
that lost so much in translation ... los[ing] the identity of the person harmed . . . the full-
ness of the harm done ... the significance of it all"); George G. Mahfood, Crafting Persua-
sive Complaints, Tr. 39 (Dec. 1992) ( "[A]lthough attorneys no longer need to plead facts,
this does not mean that they should eliminate them from complaints. Counsel's duty to a
client is to plead enough facts to tell a good story-however many facts it takes to advocate
and persuade. Persuasion is impossible without sufficient, reliable, and material data.");
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, Honoring David Shapiro: The Integration of Law
and Fact in Our Uncharted Procedural Universe, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1981, 1998 (2004)
("The idea of a 'plain and short statement of the claim' has not caught on. Few complaints
follow the models in the Appendix of Forms. Plaintiffs lawyers, knowing that some judges
read a complaint as soon as it is filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading
facts to 'educate' (that is to say, influence) the judge with regard to the nature and proba-
ble merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by
showing the defendant what a powerful case they intend to prove." (quoting Am. Nurse's
Assn. v. Ill., 783 F.2d 716, 723-724 (7th Cir. 1986)).
26. See Eastman, supra n. 5, at 808.
27. Id. at 790 (citing the Advisory Comm. Rpt. of Oct. 1955).
28. Marcus, supra n. 18, at 1768 (citing Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of
Code Pleading § 38, 244 (2d ed., West Publg. 1947)).
29. Fairman, supra n. 8, at 557.
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so that justice can be done, but also out of simple respect. "Every
client has a story that deserves to be told-from the corporate
client trying to survive in a harshly competitive climate, to a
spouse embroiled in a bitter divorce."30  And given that a very
small percentage of suits filed are ever heard by a fact-finder, the
complaint may be the plaintiffs only opportunity to tell her sto-
ry.31 Decrying the "thinness" of the language of pleadings that he
believes Rule 8 has encouraged, civil-rights lawyer and teacher
Herbert Eastman advocates "thicker," more literary pleading,
particularly in civil rights cases, incorporating devices such as
client narrative, metaphor, irony, and the lawyer's voice. 32
Where all these developments leave actual pleading practice
in notice-pleading jurisdictions in the early twenty-first century is
not clear. In the absence of empirical data, we make some tenta-
tive conclusions on the basis of our own informal, unscientific,
anecdotal survey of pleadings. It would seem that although some
federal statutory claims, in particular those alleging sexual ha-
rassment or violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, are
somewhat more carefully and "thickly" pleaded, rote form-book
pleading is the norm in complaints alleging common-law tort and
contract claims.33 Personal injury cases seem to elicit especially
derisory pleading,34 and we noted that one type of complaint was
routinely and distressingly bloodless: complaints alleging the in-
jury and wrongful death of nursing home residents. 3 At the oth-
30. Eastman, supra n. 5, at 768.
31. See Subrin & Main, supra n. 25, at 2001 ("Probably fewer than three percent of
commenced civil cases reach trial ....").
32. See Eastman, supra n. 5, at 800. He borrows the term "thinness" from James Boyd
White, who applies it to legal discourse as a whole: "thinness-so little life; but part of it is
too much life of a certain kind, an insistent assertiveness." James Boyd White, Justice as
Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism 9 (U. Chi. Press 1990).
33. We consulted some 300 complaints in the course of this project, focusing first on
common complaints like slip-and-fall, attractive nuisance, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and false imprisonment. We looked at both boilerplate forms and actual
complaints in Westlaw and Lexis databases. Still other complaints were obtained from
courts. We also looked at complaints posted online by organizations like the ACLU that
involved less common claims and told more extraordinary tales.
34. A characteristic bare-bones slip-and-fall complaint filed in federal court. (The
complaint from Breeden v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 2004 WL 3054743 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 19,
2004), is reproduced as Appendix A to this Article.)
35. The following is a typical allegation from such a complaint.
While under the exclusive care of the Defendants, individually and/or by and
through their agents and/or employees and/or servants and/or officers and/or di-
2009]
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er extreme of pleading practice are the rare complaints of epic
proportions, some written to function as press releases as well as
pleadings,36 and some out of lack of skill or judgment; such com-
plaints most usually evoke the court's wrath and scorn and are
subject to dismissal for "prolixity.''37
As for contemporary textbook advice, 38 its focus is largely on
the tactical and instrumental aspects of pleading.3 9  Most texts
rectors, Decedent HAROLD WRAY was caused to suffer numerous severe inju-
ries, he fell numerous times as the direct and proximate result of the negligence
of the Defendants, he was caused to suffer fatal injuries, he was permitted to
become very ill, his illness was not treated properly, and his physical condition
was permitted to deteriorate, he was not assessed properly, he was not diag-
nosed properly, he did not receive adequate care and treatment after he suf-
fered injury, all as a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or reck-
lessness of the Defendants, individually and/or by and through their agents
and/or employees and/or officers and/or directors.
Compl. 1 4, Wray v. Wyant Woods Care Ctr., 2004 WL 5492400 (Ohio Com. Pleas Apr. 28,
2004).
What conditions caused Wray to fall? For how long did he lie on the floor after a
fall? What were his injuries? Were they painful? Was he seen by a licensed physician?
What care was and was not given? Was he toileted, bathed, and fed? What improper
assessments were made? Did attendants answer his calls for assistance and speak to him
with respect or disdain? The generic allegations leave poor Mr. Wray's story untold, and
given that it is most likely the story of so many other nursing home residents, this seems
especially sad. That the particulars would undoubtedly be gruesome and pathetic, assum-
ing the allegations to be non-frivolous, does not seem sufficient reason to omit them. In
fairness to the drafter, it could be that no one but the protagonist witnessed much of the
story and that none of the other characters have come forward. But that, too, would be a
story worth telling.
36. See e.g. Compl., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 2003 WL 23474873 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2003). The complaint in the civil lawsuit against Kobe Bryant for sexual assault is
another example. The Bryant complaint and other public relations complaints are dis-
cussed in Samuel A. Terilli et al., Lowering the Bar: Privileged Court Filings as Substitutes
for Press Releases in the Court of Public Opinion, 12 Comm. L. & Policy 143 (2007). The
authors examine the legal ramifications of this practice and the doctrines of law that push
lawyers to use pleadings as media tools and conclude that there are both adequate tools to
punish those who write pleadings merely to defame and legitimate reasons in high profile
litigation to write pleadings that promote public understanding.
37. See e.g. Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 744-745, 746 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that
complaint and related papers "requir[ed] a hand truck or cart to move"); Bill Mears,
CNN, Lawyer's Complaint Is Too Long, http:/lcnnwire.blogs.cnn.com2008/07/07l1awyers-
complaint-is-too-long/ (posted July 7, 2007, 10:00 p.m. ET) (The Title was eight pages long,
eighteen pages of defendants were listed, none of the relevant facts were alleged until page
30, and the whole document was characterized by the judge as an "odyssey" of "useless
repetition.").
38. We consulted chapters or sections on drafting pleadings in the following: Susan L.
Brody et al., Legal Drafting (Little, Brown & Co. 1994); Charles R. Calleros, Legal Method
and Writing (5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006); Barbara Child, Drafting Legal Documents:
Principles and Practices (2d ed., West Publg. Co. 1992); John C. Dernbach et al., A Practic-
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focus on the complaint as tool of tactical advantage, providing
savvy, if very general (and occasionally contradictory) advice.
One suggests the "strategic advantages" of drafting allegations
with "the maximum generality allowed," because too much speci-
ficity "might prematurely commit the plaintiff to a particular fac-
tual theory of the case." 40  Another concurs, warning that
"[a]dding more than pleading rules require is usually surplusage
that does not improve the legal adequacy of the complaint. '41 A
third text counters, however, that "generalities make it easy for
defendant to deny allegations containing them." 42  Its authors
suggest that providing more information than notice pleading re-
quires may "induce settlement negotiations and may require the
defendant to admit or deny information that will assist you with
discovery."43 Another text takes the middle road, explaining that
a complaint will be judged adequate unless "the defendant can
rightly ask, 'Where's the beef?' or 'What is plaintiff talking about?'
or 'Do I know this character?"' 44 but conceding that there is a tac-
tical role for particularized allegations, as they can be used to de-
al Guide to Legal Writing & Legal Method (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2007); R. Lawrence
Dessem, Pretrial Litigation in a Nutshell (2d ed., West Group 1998); Linda H. Edwards,
Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and Organization (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006); Eliz-
abeth Fajans et al., Writing for Law Practice (Found. Press 2004); Bryan A. Garner, The
Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style (2d ed., Thomson West 2006); Cathy Glaser et al., The
Lawyer's Craft: An Introduction to Legal Analysis, Writing, Research, and Advocacy (Lexis
Nexis 2002); Haydock et al., supra n. 3; Thomas A. Mauet, Pretrial (6th ed., Aspen Pub-
lishers 2005); Michael D. Murray & Christy Hallam DeSanctis, Legal Research, Writing,
and Analysis (Found. Press 2005); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal
Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style (5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2005); Richard K. Neu-
mann, Jr. & Sheila Simon, Legal Writing (Aspen Publishers 2008); Laurel Currie Oates &
Anne Enquist, The Legal Writing Handbook: Analysis, Research, and Writing (4th ed.,
Aspen Publishers 2006); Ray & Cox, supra n. 11; Nancy L. Schultz & Louis J. Sirico, Jr.,
Legal Writing and Other Lawyering Skills (4th ed., Lexis Nexis 2004); Helene S. Shapo et
al., Writing and Analysis in the Law (5th ed., Found. Press 2008); Robin Wellford Slocum,
Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Persuasive Argument (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
2006); Michael R. Smith, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive
Writing (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2008).
39. It should be noted, however, that advice of any sort on drafting the substantive
allegations in a complaint is sparse. Compared to the reams written on drafting the far
less common appellate brief, the literature of complaint drafting is at most a slim volume.
40. Calleros, supra n. 38, at 366.
41. See Mauet, supra n. 38, at 123.
42. See Ray & Cox, supra n. 11, at 263.
43. Id. at 255.
44. See Haydock, supra n. 3, at 89.
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fine the scope of disclosure and discovery and, by forcing specific
admissions or denials, to seek discoverable information. 45
In addition to this focus on tactics, most texts also recognize
that narrative has a role to play in complaint drafting. Com-
plaints don't just do things (e.g., provoke settlement, narrow or
broaden discovery, force admissions, gain tactical advantage by
withholding facts). They also say things; they tell stories. But of
all the texts consulted, only one sees the complaint as first and
foremost a narrative, and even there, the writers feel compelled to
characterize this as no more than their own personal take on the
matter: "[It is our view that a good pleading tells a complete,
coherent story in a persuasive way, and gives the court solid
perspective on [the] case." 46 "You will tell the story by arranging
the facts in chronological order and presenting the sequence of
events from [the] client's perspective ... [T]he reader of a well-
drafted complaint should feel that a wrong has been committed,
and that something should be done about it." 47
Narrative is generally consigned by texts to a limited role,
however. Overall, there is a seeming mistrust of stories, a sense
that the complaint's ability to do things is inevitably compromised
when it says things: telling the story may give the adversary some
advantage. Thus, storytelling is most often characterized as an
aspect of the drafter's personal style or a drafting technique best
saved for the exceptional case: "if the plaintiff has a compelling
story to tell, setting that story out in the complaint for both the
judge and later the jury to read can be an effective approach." 48
Another text notes, "some attorneys allege events with greater
specificity than is required because they wish to present a more
vivid and sympathetic story. '4 9 A third recommends that favora-
45. See id. at 90.
46. Schultz & Sirico, supra n. 38, at 247.
47. Nancy L. Schultz & Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Legal Writing and Other Lawyering Skills
229 (3d ed., Matthew Bender 1998). Our own chapter on pleadings in Writing for Law
Practice notes that "complaints have rhetorical as well as instrumental potential-that is,
they can affect the course of litigation by persuasion as well as by legal effect," and sug-
gests that it may be "important, even vital, for the court to learn more than the bare out-
lines of the plaintiffs story," and that "respect for the plaintiff as a member of the human
community suggests that his story should not be reduced to boilerplate." Fajans et al.,
supra n. 38 at 37-38.
48. See Mauet, supra n. 38, at 124; see also Fajans et al., supra n. 38, at 37.
49. Calleros, supra, n. 38, at 367.
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ble facts be presented "precisely and graphically" and unfavorable
facts be presented generally.50 Other than such recommendations
on the level of detail, the only narrative techniques alluded to in
the texts are chronology and tone, and those only very generally. 51
It is easy to criticize such advice, but very difficult to do bet-
ter. Although notice pleading makes acceptable pleading easier,
it does not, ironically, make the job of the careful pleader, new
attorney, or teacher easier. Surely, drafting the substantive alle-
gations in a complaint presents the drafter more contingencies
(and imponderables) to negotiate than any other document law-
yers are called upon create. Once the facts have been gathered,
the law researched, and the claims, defendants, jurisdiction, and
venue settled upon, questions of what to say, how much to say,
and how to say it remain. The need to advance some facts in a
fact-pleading jurisdiction rules out one option--entirely conclu-
sory allegations-but it leaves many choices still to be made. To
plead not just adequately, but effectively, the drafter must con-
50. Child, supra, n. 38, at 43.
51. One text urges readers to remember that allegations should use chronological
order. Brody et al., supra, n. 38, at 300. On tone in complaints, the texts speak with one
voice: facts should be stated "precisely and unemotionally," Ray and Cox, supra n. 11, at
263, using "objective" words. Child, supra n. 38, at 37 (adding the baffling thought that
these objective words may be chosen with attention to their "positive or negative connota-
tions"). They should be "quiet and understated" in order not to "alienate the court ...
[because] judges often view emotional language as a mask for a weak case." Brody, supra,
n. 38, at 292. "Draft pleadings in plain English." Garner, supra n. 38, at 386. "[D]o not
editorialize, or use unnecessary modifiers." Schultz & Sirico, supra n. 47, at 228. '"Write in
short active sentences, eliminating adjectives and adverbs wherever possible." Brody,
supra, n. 38, at 305; see also Schultz & Sirico, supra n. 38, at 248 ("write short plain sen-
tences"). In short, the consensus is that the good pleader's literary canon begins and ends
with Hemingway.
Yet Herbert Eastman has harsh words for exhortations to "plain" and "objective"
prose.
We now find ourselves entering the era of plain writing ... [but] "simple prose
depends on concepts like 'objective fact."' These premises are assumptions
about reality that we can no longer accept as true .... Most problematic of all
for the plain speakers, this pretense of objectivity is not self critical, and it as-
signs to itself an undeserved neutrality of belief and values. In any case, plain
writing must evolve in some direction, since it situates itself on untenable pre-
mises. While no one need defend the virtue of abandoning nineteenth-century
legalese, it does not follow that plain writing is anything other than the twen-
tieth century's version of legalese, greatly improved, but still improvable.
See Eastman, supra n. 5, at 808-809 (quoting Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The
Words That Remade America 148-149 (Simon & Schuster 1992)).
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sider all too many factors. The nature of the action is a consider-
ation (sexual harassment, say, as opposed to a contractual dispute
between buyer and seller of widgets), as is the nature of plaintiff
(war widow or porn star) and defendant (debt collector or veteri-
narian). How well developed the facts are matters, as do the
strength of the case on the known facts, the likelihood of settle-
ment, the relative resources of the parties, and the relative uni-
queness of the issues. The personality and preferences of the
court matter. The personality and experience of opposing counsel
matter. If the obstacle to effective pleading was once suffocating
technicality, in a notice-pleading jurisdiction it is now oppressive
freedom and mind-boggling contingency. Small wonder so many
drafters give up and resort to boilerplate.
As noted at the outset, we believe that one way to ease the
task of the practitioner, student, and teacher is to pay closer at-
tention to the inherently narrative nature of pleading and to ap-
ply narratiye theory and narrative drafting techniques in an at-
tempt to reconcile the instrumental and rhetorical aspects of
pleading. Because whatever else they might be or do, whatever
the wrongs alleged, complaints are always themselves narratives
in which a client's troubles are folded into a cognizable legal
claim. 52 The plaintiff complains of the disruption of "an initial
steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of things" 53
and seeks redress-restoration of the "old steady state."54 The
complaint ends with the plea for redress-the ad damnum
clause-because a complaint is in fact an unfinished narrative, a
half-told tale that awaits action by the court that will turn it into
a comedy (if redress is granted) or tragedy (leading to the sacrifice
and isolation of the plaintiff)55 if it is denied.
52. One of the leading texts on legal storytelling characterizes pleadings as
"[r]hetorical narratives," that is, texts that "use a story rather than a set of propositional
assertions to prove something persuasively." Anthony Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner,
Minding the Law 134 (Harv. U. Press 2000) (emphasis in original). Rhetorical narratives
convince in part to the extent that they are "value-laden," that is, they contrast "the ordi-
nary or expected state of things" with "the precipitating incident that brings ordinariness
into question." Id. at 135; see also Jan Armon, A Method for Writing Factual Complaints,
1998 Det. C. L. Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 109, 120 (1998) (noting that the elements of a claim
tell its "paradigmatic story").
53. Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 113.
54. Id. at 114.
55. See Northrup Frye, Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology 16 (Harcourt,
Brace & World Inc. 1963).
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When the complaint is viewed in this light, as a plot line to be
developed effectively, the careful drafter's job is to use traditional
storytelling techniques to the client's advantage. How the drafter
employs these techniques depends on the drafter's analysis of the
rhetorical situation-the exigencies of audience and purpose.
A complaint with allegations made in spare (but carefully
wrought) prose with a minimum of (carefully chosen) detail is as
much a narrative as a "thicker" pleading elaborately developing
the plaintiffs grievances and the defendant's shortcomings. The
former narrative style would be appropriate if the particular
judge was known to disapprove of all but bare-bones pleading, if
the defendant is believed to be stonily opposed to settlement, and
if the pleader hopes to develop the facts further through broad
discovery. In contrast, where the facts are already well-
developed, where quick resolution would be in defendant's as well
as plaintiffs interest, and where the issue is one of interest to the
wider community, a story told with more incident, more detail,
and more color would seem to be more effective.
Of course, these are easy examples, cases where audiences
and purposes work in harmony. Very often there are conflicts-
for example, a judge hostile to all but bare-bones pleading and a
plaintiff with a story that cries out to be told in its fullness-and
for this quandary there is no easy answer, just the careful, hope-
ful exercise of the attorney's best judgment and craft in telling the
tale.
II THE NATURE AND PRACTICE OF NARRATIVE
Narrative can help complaint drafters 56 avoid the simplistic
(and inaccurate) dichotomy of default, minimalistic boiler-plate-
driven pleading on the one side and, on the other side, the rare,
more individualized pleading that tells the "exceptional" plain-
tiffs story. Even in familiar and uncomplicated complaints, narr-
56. Though we discuss only complaints, there are times when storytelling techniques
are useful in answers, as well. Affirmative defenses are often their own narratives, and in
a few fact-pleading jurisdictions, the defendants are required to give their side of the story
when they deny allegations. See supra n. 1 and accompanying text. Affirmative defenses
do not ordinarily lend themselves to the full range of narrative techniques described in this
Article. For example, because in most jurisdictions, most defenses will be deemed waived
if not raised in or before the answer, defenses should ordinarily be raised as generally and
inclusively as possible. See Fajans et al., supra n. 38, at 71-72.
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ative techniques can capture a busy judge's attention and shake
opposing counsel's confidence. Given the conventions of the form,
however, drafting a cohesive and convincing narrative in a com-
plaint is as challenging as it is desirable. Putting individual
averments into numbered paragraphs that are gathered into
counts too easily leads to a "syncopated rhythm that does not re-
semble a coherent narrative," 57 much less a persuasive one.
To conquer such an unforgiving form, lawyers first need to
understand narrative and narrative technique. A review of legal
writing textbooks suggests that students get little schooling in
either. And what instruction on narrative there is usually focuses
on statements of fact in appellate briefs. Texts tell students to
develop a theory or theme-that is, to tell the story from the
client's point of view-but give little advice about how to accom-
plish this.58 Only a few texts explain what is involved in finding a
theme or a story,59 developing character, 60 or structuring a narra-
tive creatively. 61 Thus, we take some time here to discuss narra-
tive theory and narrative techniques before suggesting how these
techniques can be applied to complaint drafting.
A. The Nature of Narrative62
Perhaps the first point that needs to be made is that adding
specific facts to a complaint-even those selected on the basis of
their legal relevance-does not create a narrative. This is because
57. See Subrin & Main, supra n. 25, at 1998-1999.
58. What suggestions they give are sound but fairly general: humanize the client;
emphasize favorable facts and de-emphasize or neutralize unfavorable facts (but do not
omit or misrepresent significant facts); save the beginning and ending for favorable facts;
use chronological or topical organization; and find vivid nouns and verbs (but sound rea-
sonable and not too emotional). See Calleros, supra n. 38, at 385-387, 437-440; Dernbach
et al., supra n. 38, at 279-289; Edwards, supra n. 38, at 323-139; Glaser et al., supra n. 38,
at 358-367; Murray & DeSanctis et al., supra n. 38, at 379-389; Oates et al., supra n. 38,
at 387-396; Ray & Cox, supra n. 38, at 167-192; Shapo et al., supra n. 38, at 410-420;
Slocum, supra n. 11, at 472-473.
59. See Edwards, supra n. 38, at 327; Fajans et al., supra n. 38, at 174; see also Neu-
mann, supra n. 38, at 372; Neumann & Simon, supra n. 38, at 199-202.
60. See Edwards, supra n. 38, at 328; see also Fajans et al., supra n. 38, at 187; Neu-
mann & Simon, supra n. 38, at 202.
61. See Edwards, supra n 37 at 325; see also Fajans et al., supra n. 38, at 181; Neu-
mann & Simon, supra n. 38, at 208; Neumann, supra n. 38, at 374-375.
62. The heading comes from the title of a well known book, The Nature of Narrative
(Robert Scholes & Robert Kellogg, Oxford U. Press, Inc. 1966).
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stories are not just recipes for stringing together a set of
"hard facts" . . . [instead] stories construct the facts that
comprise them. For this reason, much of human reality and
its facts are not merely recounted by narrative but consti-
tuted by it. To the extent that law is fact-contingent, it is
inescapably rooted in narrative. '63
And to the extent that a plausible story is the backbone of the
theory of the case, lawyers must provide context and structure
that organize the facts into a legally sufficient, plausible, and per-
suasive narrative.
A plausible narrative also requires more than linear continui-
ty. Simple succession is meaningless. It creates neither a story
nor a lawsuit. As Northrup Frye says, "At a certain point in
narrative, our sense of linear continuity changes perspective and
we see design or unifying structure."64 Thus, traditional narra-
tives are built on the "philosophical error of post hoc, ergo propter
hoc; narrative plotting makes it seem that if B follows A it is be-
cause B is somehow logically entailed by A. And certainly, it is
part of the 'logic' of the narrative to make it appear that temporal
connection is also causal connection." 65 In other words, "any narr-
ative telling presupposes an end that will transform its apparent-
ly random details 'as annunciations, as promises' of what is to
come, and that what-is-to-come transforms because it gives mean-
ing to, makes significant the details as leading to the end."66
For a story to have narrative significance there must be a
completed process of change. 67 There is surprising agreement
63. See Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 111 (emphasis omitted).
64. Northup Frye et al., Myth and Symbol: Critical Approaches and Applications, A
Selection of Papers Delivered at the Joint Meeting of the Midwest Modern Language Asso-
ciation and the Central Renaissance Conference 7-8 (Bernice Slote ed., U. Neb. Press
1963); see also Peter Brooks, "Inevitable Discovery"- Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15
Yale J.L. & Humanities 71, 93 (2003) ("If narrative went nowhere-never became a com-
plete story-there would be no decisive enchainment of its incidents, no sense of inevitable
discovery.").
65. See Brooks, supra n. 64, at 94 (citing Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structur-
al Analysis of Narrative, in The Barthes Reader 266 (Susan Sontag ed., Richard Howard
trans. 1982)).
66. Id. at 94; see also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225, 2235 (1989) ("For an account
to be perceived as a coherent narrative or story, it must be more than a 'simple succession'
or 'enumeration of events in serial order'; it must be 'a configuration."' ).
67. David Lodge, The Art of Fiction 217 (Penguin Bks. 1992) (citing R.S. Crane).
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among narrative theorists about the elements of this process. As
summarized by Amsterdam and Bruner, there is
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the ordinariness of
things
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circums-
tances attributable to human agency or susceptible to
change by human intervention,
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation,
which succeed or fail
(4) so that the steady state is restored or a new (trans-
formed) steady state is created,
(5) and the story concluded by drawing the then-and-there of
the tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the
telling through some coda-say, for example, Aesop's
characteristic moral of the story.68
Although the components of narrative are stable, the nature
of the trouble or conflict varies. It may stem from conflict with
another, from conflict within the self, or from conflict with socie-
ty.69 But whatever the trigger, the conflict arises out of a disjunc-
tion between the "Agent, Act, Purpose (or Goal) and Agency (or
Means) and Scene." 70 If, for example, a protagonist has the ho-
68. See Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 113-114 (emphasis in original); see also
Winter, supra n. 66, at 2240 ("The antagonist is, typically, the agent that causes the im-
balance. The protagonist meets the antagonist, and a struggle ensues. This provides an
agon as the pivotal point of the narrative. Its resolution also restores the initial state of
balance and provides a sense of closure."); Brian Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101:
A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact
Sections, 32 Rutgers L. J. 459, 466 (2001) (a story 'focuses on a central character, the pro-
tagonist, who is faced with a dilemma; the dilemma develops into a crisis; the crisis builds
through a series of complications to a climax; in the climax, the crisis is solved ... [by the
protagonist] "getting or not getting what he wanted"). Ruth Anne Robbins encourages
lawyers to cast their clients as the heroes of their own lawsuit stories, heroes who are
sufficiently imperfect to elicit audience identification, but who are also on a transformative
journey that has the power to change the hero and potentially the hero's society. Ruth
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using
Characters and Paradigms of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767,
790-791 (2006).
69. See e.g. Foley & Robbins, supra n. 68, at 469 (quoting from a writing workshop by
Josip Novakovich).
70. Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 130 (discussing Kenneth Burke).
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norable goal of procuring food for hungry children, but accom-
plishes that goal by breaking and entering, the act inappropriate-
ly achieves the goal, and conflict and disorder result. A similar
conflict arises from the disjunction of purpose and agency when
the police, seeking to rid a community of drug dealers, act hastily
and in reliance on anonymous tips, invading the apartment of a
frail eighty-three-year-old woman.
This organization of events into a meaningful progression
from steady state to conflict and then to resolution is one reason
why narrative plays such a central role, and has such persuasive
force, in the law. But narrative is also persuasive because "narra-
tive forms are not only immediately recognizable, but . . . they
allow us to assign meaning to events through 'pre-given under-
standings of common events and concepts, configured into the
particular pattern of story-meaning.' Narratives strike us as nat-
ural ways of understanding experience." 71  "People, including
judges and jurors, understand and restate events in terms of sto-
ries."72 Amsterdam and Bruner posit two theories for why this is
true. First is the endogenous theory, which holds that "narrative
is inherent either in the nature of the human mind, [or] in the
nature of language . . . ."73 Narrative structures might be, for ex-
ample, some type of Kantian category that fashions our under-
standing and experience of the world. 74 A second theory is that
narrative structures model, are a reflection of, culturally shared
forms of experience, 75 perhaps because "humans experience social
reality temporally or . . . the human life cycle itself contains the
elements of a narrative structure-a beginning, middle, and end,
to which we assign meaning."76  But regardless of the theory
adopted,
71. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 Leg. Writing 53, 60 (2008) (citing Bernard Jackson, Law, Fact, and Narrative Coherence
37-60 (Deborah Charles Publg. 1988)).
72. See Eastman, supra n. 5, at 769 (quoting Michael E. Tigar, Examining Witnesses 5
(ABA 2003)).
73. Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 115.
74. Id. at 116.
75. Id. at 116-117. Steven Winter sees the role of narrative in the process of social
construction as a link between experience and the effective crystallization of social mores.
Winter, supra n. 66, at 2228.
76. See Rideout, supra n. 71 (providing a good summary of these theories in this Ar-
ticle).
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[t]raditional models of legal adjudication, which are based
solely on informal or formal models of logic, are increasingly
seen as incomplete, or inadequate, for fully describing the
persuasiveness of legal arguments. The "deeper" logic of
narrative structures adds to more traditional models for le-
gal argumentation. 77
In other words, in addition to abstract logic, there is such a thing
as narrative rationality, a rationality that sees paradigms in hu-
man stories that help to explain the meaning of those stories. 78
If these theories help to explain the centrality of narrative in
law, they do not explain why one narrative might seem more ra-
tional, more credible, than another or how the audience of a story
comes to believe one account of events rather than another. Some
theorists think judgments about credibility depend on narrative
coherence, correspondence, and fidelity.79
Narrative coherence requires a story to be both internally
consistent-that is, the evidence and the story must comport with
each other-as well as complete-that is, there must be sufficient
facts to ground whatever inferences need to be made.80 In a com-
plaint, that means that there should be some specific support for
the allegations, that the facts alleged must bear on, "go to," the
elements of the claim, and that every element of every claim must
be alleged.
Narrative correspondence results when a party's particular
story corresponds with socially normative versions of similar sto-
ries. These normative versions have been described as "narra-
tives," "scripts," or "stock scripts" and are immediately recogniza-
ble, allowing for easy generalizations about the story's signific-
ance.81 Stock scripts enable us to organize experience, even when
we have limited information, because
77. See id. at 60. As Ruth Anne Robbins notes, much legal narrative theory is in-
debted in part to Carl Jung's notion of the collective unconscious, anthropologist, Sir
James Frazer's observations on the similarity of tribal rituals throughout the world, and
Joseph Campbell's work demonstrating that "rituals mimic myths." See Robbins, supra n.
68, at 773-775.
78. See e.g. Rideout, supra n. 71 (tracing the development of narrative rationality in
the works of Robert Burns, Walter Fisher, W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, and
Bernard Jackson).
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 64-66.
81. Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 121-122; see also Rideout, supra n. 71, at
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(1) they draw upon direct physical and cultural knowledge,
(2) they are highly generalized in order to capture and relate
a broad range of particularized fact situations, (3) they are
unconscious structures of thought that are invoked automat-
ically and unreflexively to make sense of new information,
and (4) they are not determinate, objective characterizations
of reality, but rather idealized structures that effectively
characterize some but not all of the varied situations that
humans confront in their daily interactions.8 2
Lawyers, of course, are familiar with stock stories peculiar to
law.8 3 In civil actions, the stock story is one
in which there has been trouble in the world that has af-
fected the plaintiff adversely and is attributable to the de-
fendant. The defendant must counter with a story in which
it is claimed that nothing wrong happened to the plaintiff (or
that the plaintiffs conception of wrong does not fit the law's
definition), or, if there has been a legally cognizable wrong,
then it is not the defendant's fault.8 4
This generic script is further particularized by the claims or caus-
es of action in a complaint and the affirmative defenses in an an-
swer. Some examples of common stock stories in complaints are
"slip-and-fall," "deadbeat dad," "corporate greed," "bait-and-
switch," and "predatory lending."
In other words, a complaint achieves narrative correspon-
dence by alleging a stock story that makes out a legally cognizable
wrong. The writer taps into "stock" information and combines it
with "new information," information that is a particularization,
concretization, or illustration of the stock story.8 5 Even then, the
68-69. Rideout identifies the Conquering Hero turns Tyrant as one example of a stock
script. The hero rescues the community and is rewarded with power. Then, because of
some flaw or deception, he becomes a tyrant. The script can end either with his redemp-
tion or with his destruction.
82. Winter, supra n. 66, at 2234; see also Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1984). Stock structures form an interpretative network: "What goes on...
is never approached sui generis, but rather is seen through these stock structures. Once the
principal features of a given phenomenon suggest a particular stock story structure, that
structure shapes our expectations and responses."
83. See Smith, supra n 37, at 44.
84. Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 52, at 117.
85. See Smith, supra n. 38, at 45.
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transformation or resolution and coda occur only when the dis-
pute is resolved. In this sense, the complaint and answer togeth-
er present a twice-told tale, but each is only half-told.
Finally, there is narrative fidelity, which persuades the au-
dience to make a comparative judgment about the competing
narratives based not just on stock scripts or abstract legal or
moral principles, but on practical judgments about what the larg-
er community would deem the right thing to do in that case.8 6 As
Eastman explicates, as translators for our clients' stories and
voices
we have a responsibility to translate as truly as we can ....
If language proves incapable of capturing the truth, if we
cannot translate reality accurately, we can nonetheless
translate meaningfully. Our language will be "judged by its
coherence, by the kinds of fidelity it establishes with the
original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning it performs
as a gesture of its own.'8 7
In pleadings, narrative fidelity is achieved when our clients can
recognize their own stories and, as Winters explains, when the
rest of our audience instinctively feels "that really happened and
justice must be done."'8 Fidelity depends upon "a sense... [that]
certain outcomes seem more legitimate than others. If not for
that sense, no legal system could survive without the constant
exercise of raw, repressive society."8 9 A complaint that has narra-
86. See Rideout, supra n. 71, at 69-86.
87. See Eastman, supra n. 5, at 856 (quoting James Boyd White, Justice as Translation
256 (U. Chi. Press 1990)).
88. See Winter, supra n. 66, at 2257 (quoting Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Stu-
dies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 Geo. L.J. 1, 5 (1987)).
89. Id.; see also Northrup Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays 166-170 (Prin-
ceton U. Press 1957). Frye notes,
The action of comedy in moving from one social center to another is not unlike
the action of a lawsuit, in which plaintiff and defendant construct different ver-
sions of the same situation, one finally being judged as real and the other as il-
lusory. This resemblance of the rhetoric of comedy to the rhetoric of jurispru-
dence has been recognized from the earliest times. A little pamphlet called the
Tractatus Coislinianus, closely related to Aristotle's Poetics, which sets down all
the essential facts about comedy in about a page and a half, divides the dianoia
of comedy into two parts, opinion (pistis) and proof (gnosis). These correspond
roughly to the usurping and the desirable societies respectively. Proofs (i.e., the
means of bringing about the happier society) are subdivided into oaths, com-
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tive correspondence and coherence will be a competent, even ef-
fective pleading. But a complaint that achieves narrative fidelity
is a far greater achievement in professional and human terms.
B. Narrative Techniques and Their Application
In the course of a legal dispute, a client's story is told and re-
told, and the audience (the parties, counsel, the court, and, in the
rare case that goes to trial, the fact-finder) construct and recon-
struct it as they try to make sense of the evolving and conflicting
narratives put before them.90 Successful resolution of the dispute
depends, in considerable part, on how well the storyteller imbues
the client's story with narrative coherence, correspondence, and
fidelity. And these, in turn, depend upon the storyteller's grasp of
narrative theory and skillful use of the basic techniques of story-
telling detailed below: sequence, characters, point of view and
theory, scene, detail, and tone. For example, unless the allega-
tions are supported by some specific detail-whether elaborate or
spare, a litany of detail or just one telling quote-the story will
lack coherence. Unless the plaintiff and defendant emerge as ful-
ly realized individuals, as characters rather than cardboard pro-
totypes, the story will lack fidelity.
The techniques discussed below are all interrelated and often
inextricably intertwined in practice. For example, we can create
character through tone and detail, create tone through the use of
detail, create point of view through sequence and tone. Nonethe-
less, we think separating out these techniques as discrete catego-
pacts, witnesses, ordeals .... and laws-in other words the five forms of ma-
terial proof in law cases listed in the Rhetoric. We notice how often the action of
a Shakespearean comedy begins with some absurd, cruel, or irrational law ....
which the action of comedy then evades or breaks .... Thus the movement
from pistis to gnosis, from a society controlled by habit, ritual bondage, arbi-
trary law and the older character to a society controlled by youth and pragmatic
freedom is fundamentally, as the Greek words suggest, a movement from illu-
sion to reality .... The watcher of death and tragedy hag nothing to do but sit
and wait for the inevitable; but something gets born at the end of a comedy ....
Id. Frye seems to be touching on something similar to narrative fidelity here.
90. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie's work on jurors' decision-making indicates
that jurors construct stories as they hear testimony and ultimately pick the story that
makes the most sense. Increasingly, story construction is seen as playing a central role in
decision-making. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 520 (1991).
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ries provides a useful structure for practitioners, students, and
teachers, a way to talk about complaints, both in critiquing and in
drafting.
1. Sequence
The ways to present the sequence of events in a narrative are
as variable as the types of conflict and disjunction in that narra-
tive. The easiest and clearest structure is straight chronology.
The writer begins at the beginning by describing the steady state,
then chronicles its disruption, the quest for redress or transfor-
mation, and the consequences of that quest. And, indeed, in the
law, this type of chronology is often the organization that is the
most effective-in legal prose as opposed to more inventive Hol-
lywood scripts that use flashbacks, interwoven plot strands, and
the like-stories are best told chronologically. "Chronology is,
then, the bread and butter of fact writers."91
There are, however, a number of reasons-persuasion being
one of the most important-for abandoning a linear structure. As
two experts warn,
chronology can become what we call a "default organization,"
structurally similar to the automatic moves a computer pro-
gram will make unless the user instructs it otherwise. De-
faults can be quite dangerous .... Habitual chronology can
distract us from telling an effective story that complements
and enhances our legal argument. 92
Altering the normal past-to-present sequence with a deft flash-
back or flash-forward can be an effective way to focus the reader's
attention on a particular fact.
One of the most effective non-linear sequences begins in me-
dia res-in the middle of the story-starting at a critical point in
the narrative and then drawing back in time to describe the cha-
racters in the story and the events that brought them to that crit-
ical point. Opening in this fashion with a compelling scene is an
91. Stephen V. Armstrong & Timothy P. Terrell, Organizing Facts to Tell a Story, 9
Persps. 90, 90 (2001).
92. Id.
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excellent way to hook the reader. The novelist Alice Adams often
uses this formula, which she labels ABDCE, for
Action, Background, Development, Climax, and Ending.
You begin with action that is compelling enough to draw us
in, make us want to know more. Background is where you
let us see and know who these people are, how they've come
to be together, what was going on before the opening of the
story. Then you develop these people so we learn what they
care most about. The plot-the drama, the actions, the ten-
sion will grow out of that. You move them along until every-
thing comes together in the climax, after which things are
different for the main characters, different in some real way.
And then there is the ending: what is our sense of who these
people are now, what are they left with, what happened, and
what did it mean?93
A variation on this organization begins by compressing time: pro-
viding a dramatic summary of the story before going back to start
at the beginning.
Still another type of narrative sequence is the convergent
narratives structure. Here the writer follows different characters
through a series of events in a parallel structure until their sto-
ries converge and their lives are changed.9 4
Finally, in structuring a story, a writer must always think
about where to begin and where to end it, a decision informed for
lawyers by their theory of the case. Armstrong and Terrell give
an example of how different beginning and ending points change
the story of a juvenile accused of breaking and entering, the de-
fense counsel and prosecutor would likely start their narratives at
different points:
If we begin at the Smithville orphanage, as [defendant] G.L.
runs away with only the clothes she is wearing, we tell one
story. If we begin with a list of G.L.'s alleged crimes, fol-
lowed by a vignette of the Barrs [complainants] returning
from a PTA meeting to find their home violated, we tell a
very different story ... [as we do if we end] with an intruder
93. Anne Lamott, Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life 62 (Anchor Bks.
1995) (quoting Alice Adams).
94. Theodore A. Rees Cheney, Writing Creative Nonfiction 155 (Ten Speed Press 2001).
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running out of the house, or with a frightened child hiding in
the bushes, then captured and "incarcerated" by the po-
lice[.] 95
Defense counsel would rely on the stock story of the abused or-
phan. That story goes back in time to humanize the protagonist
and de-emphasize her supposed offenses. The prosecutor is tell-
ing more of a "home invasion" story. It begins in media res, with
the complainants' return to their vandalized home, in order to
emphasize the fear and sense of violation they experienced.
Like all storytellers, careful complaint drafters make con-
scious choices among these techniques for sequencing their narra-
tive, suiting the technique to their audience and purpose. In a
factually and legally complex case, more than one technique may
be appropriate, especially when a sympathetic plaintiff complains
of horrendous and protracted mistreatment. In such a case, the
goals of narrative coherence, correspondence, and fidelity, and
thus of persuasion, are well served by beginning the complaint,
not with the expected jurisdictional allegations, nor with the be-
ginning of the story, but in medias res with an "introduction" or
"preliminary statement." This statement "creates a good first im-
pression and demonstrates mastery of the facts and the law....
The ultimate purpose of the preliminary statement is to persuade
the judge of the merits of the plaintiffs claim before he or she un-
dertakes any lengthy review of the case."96
This technique was used to good effect in a complaint in
which an Ethiopian woman employed by a wealthy New Jersey
couple alleges human trafficking and involuntary servitude, as
well as many federal and state statutory violations and violations
of New Jersey tort law.
1. In this action, Plaintiff Beletashachew Chere seeks dam-
ages from Defendants Fesseha Taye and Alemtashai Girma
(collectively Defendants) under federal law, including the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; state law, including the New
Jersey minimum wage and overtime laws and New Jersey
tort law; and international law, including treaty and custo-
95. See Armstrong & Terrell, supra n. 91, at 90.
96. Mahfood, supra n. 25, at 39.
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mary international law prohibitions against trafficking in
persons, enslavement, involuntary servitude, and forced la-
bor.
2. Defendants induced Ms. Chere to come to the United
States from Ethiopia through fraudulent means and then
held her as an involuntary servant for almost one and a half
years. During this time, Defendants forced Ms. Chere to
work in their home for as many as one hundred hours per
week without pay. Defendants kept Ms. Chere in a condi-
tion of involuntary servitude and forced labor through
threats of serious harm to her person and well-being and
through a pattern of behavior that caused Ms. Chere to rea-
sonably believe that harm would come to her if she failed to
continue performing the household duties assigned by De-
fendants or if she otherwise reported Defendants' conduct to
responsible authorities. Ms. Chere was finally able to escape
Defendants' home with the assistance of acquaintances and
family.97
This compressed narrative engages the reader's sympathies, es-
tablishes the drafter as a knowledgeable and skillful melder of
law and fact, and provides a roadmap for the subsequent sixty-
some paragraphs in which the plaintiffs tale is told.98
97. Compl. 1-2, Chere v. Taye, No. 2:04-cv-06264-SRC-CCC (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2004)
(available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/wrp%20chere%20complaint%20final%20filed
.pdf).
98. Just as this introduction effectively begins the story of plaintiffs misfortunes,
many introductions to complaints are missed opportunities. A complaint alleging that
plaintiffs were negligently exposed to toxic substances as they participated in rescue and
cleanup activities after the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center is so mired in
boilerplate legalese and redundancy that the extraordinary story is effectively lost to view.
1. Plaintiffs bring this action against the Defendants seeking redress for inju-
ries they have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer, as a result of the
Defendants' reckless, grossly negligent, and negligent operation, ownership,
maintenance, control, supervision, and management of the premises or place of
business known as and/or located at: [addresses]; all in the City, County and
State of New York, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (herei-
nafter referred to as "the locations").
2. Because of the damage sustained in the attacks, the Twin Towers and Seven
World Trade Center collapsed, spreading known and unknown toxic substances
throughout the World Trade Center Site and the surrounding areas, including
"the locations," portions of which, although operated, owned, leased, main-
tained, controlled, supervised, and managed by the Defendants, remained dan-
gerous, defective, hazardous, toxic, unguarded, unsupervised, and unprotected
for multiple days, weeks, and/or months thereafter. The Plaintiff participated
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Those detailed substantive allegations follow basic narrative
chronology: a steady state of ordinariness (Ms. Chere's life in
Ethiopia with her family), disruption (her emigration and em-
ployment by the defendants, who enslave and abuse her mentally
and physically), and efforts at redress (her escape and subsequent
suit against her tormentors). The last two stages of the narrative,
"redress/transformation" and the "coda" or meaning of the story,
will depend on the outcome of the litigation. Helpful headings in
the complaint emphasize the elements of the narrative. For ex-
ample, the steady state comes first, under the heading "Circums-
tances Leading to Ms. Chere's Employment with Defendants."
Succeeding headings describe the many varieties of disruption
and trouble allegedly endurea by the plaintiff. Her subsequent
efforts at redress and transformation fall under the heading "Es-
cape from Defendants."
In a complex case like Ms. Chere's, this detailed from-the-
beginning telling of the tale is appropriately followed by the many
separate claims that the allegations give rise to, with relevant
paragraphs of the story realleged by reference. Thus, in such a
case, the story is told and retold from the beginning multiple
times: in the introduction, in a background narrative, and then in
each of the separate counts. Realleging by reference saves the
story from redundancy and tedium.
For a simple, familiar claim arising out of a familiar story, a
slip-and-fall, for example, strict chronology is a good choice, but
even with such a simple claim, there may be effective variations.
The story might begin in media res with plaintiff innocently walk-
ing down the street, only to fall suddenly and violently on her'
back; the story might then flash back to the previous day's ice
storm. On the other hand, if the stock story is "slum landlord,"
the chronology might begin earlier, with defendant's radical
downsizing of the janitorial staff in a cost-cutting measure.
in rescue and/or recovery and/or construction, and/or excavation and/or demoli-
tion and/or clean-up operations at the buildings and/or place of business known
as and/or located at the "locations," on or about October 1, 2001, and during the
days, weeks and/or months that followed.
Compl. 1Ml 1-2, Sobol v. Syms Corp., 2006 WL 2307834 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (emphasis
omitted).
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The "converging destinies" sequence can also be a useful
technique in a complaint. The traditional introduction of the par-
ties at the beginning of a complaint can be expanded to tell the
story of the plaintiff and defendant up to the time of the disrup-
tion. Obviously, plaintiff has every interest in using this struc-
ture when plaintiffs history enhances his credibility or defen-
dant's puts him in a bad light. For example, a plaintiff alleging
police brutality might be introduced through his history as a re-
cent immigrant, employed and supporting a family, with no arrest
record, a man walking home from his night shift. The defendant,
a relatively new officer, was discharged from the armed forces for
undisclosed reasons, and has a history of disciplinary violations
and civilian complaints, one of them alleging that the officer tar-
gets people from plaintiffs ethnic group. On the day in question,
shortly before he went out on foot patrol, he had been informed
that one of those complaints was proceeding to a hearing. The
destinies of plaintiff and defendant then converge in the rest of
the allegations, as the officer approaches the plaintiff.
Similarly, in commercial litigation, the complaint can effec-
tively lead up to the dispute in question by "describing the evolu-
tion and development of the client's business or financial condi-
tion . . . [because t]he client's behavior will be measured against
his or her sophistication, wealth, and business practices."99
Counsel should then "focus[ ] attention on the manner in which
the defendant has institutionalized abusive practices to sustain
wealth and to dominate the market . . . to convey to the reader
that the defendant has made a practice of commercially unrea-
sonable and exploitive conduct."'00 The stage is thus set for the
story of the parties' mutual dealings, the convergence of their des-
tinies.101 Allegations concerning the claims themselves can also
be organized around parallel stories. For example, a drafter can
begin with an account of a plaintiffs movements in the store and
then cut to the movements of the store's security guards as they
become suspicious and begin tracking the plaintiff. These narra-
tives converge when the guards confront the suspected shoplifter.
99. See Mahfood, supra n. 25, at 39.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Converging destiny structure is also appropriate in a class action since, by its
nature, a class action tells many stories.
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Finally, it should be noted with respect to chronology that
rote, unthinking use of "on or about" or "at all times material and
relevant to this case" in complaints neither enhances the credibil-
ity of the narrative in a complaint nor provides tactical advan-
tage. As readers, we want to know when a significant event hap-
pened; if the narrator is not certain of the timing, perhaps the
account is not to be trusted in other respects. We know that "once
upon a time" introduces a fairy-tale; "on or about" is not much
more credible. Alleging exact dates makes a story feel real. Al-
though exact dates should not be alleged unless the drafter is cer-
tain of them, 10 2 exact dates, or at a minimum, exact months,
should ordinarily result from proper investigation of a client's
claim. Allegation of exact dates will both add credibility to the
story and render defendant's eventual admission or denial more
meaningful. As for the stale, legalese formulation "at all times
material and relevant," "[i]t is often unnecessary, because specific
dates can be provided."103 Moreover, it ill-serves the client's in-
terest, because "it is an open invitation to denial of the fact. Be-
cause the phrase has no precise or clearly understood meaning, no
attorney could admit that a fact was true 'at all times material
and relevant to this case."' 10 4
2. Characters
To achieve narrative rationality, characters need to be devel-
oped so that they feel real to the reader, not like cardboard proto-
types. The reader must be persuaded to empathize with them or
disapprove of them. That means that the writer must both un-
derstand the characters-their needs, dreams, fears, weaknesses,
experiences, circumstances-and know how to convey that under-
standing.
102. This is because an allegation of a date or time is considered material, and by
pleading the date or time, the pleader makes a judicial admission of that date, an admis-
sion that could prove damaging should the defendant advance a statute of limitations
defense. Qualifying the date by adding "on or about" results in the pleading not constitut-
ing an admission. See Haydock et. al., supra n. 3, at 103. Moreover, the defendant may
ordinarily deny an allegation containing the wrong date, even if the rest of the allegation is
true.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Character can be established directly, by describing a prota-
gonist's thoughts or by describing physical "appearance, clothes,
possessions, body language, etc. which act as indices of class, cha-
racter, status and social milieu .... 105 Describing body lan-
guage is another effective way to suggest character. For example,
there is a difference between persons making eye contact and a
person becoming aware that he or she is the object of someone's
unblinking stare. The former suggests a moment of shared inti-
macy, the latter an uncomfortable intrusion.
Character can also be established indirectly through action
and dialogue. In fact, dialogue is one of the best ways to show
character. One writer of creative nonfiction reports the ancient
Greeks to have said, "Speak so I may see you." 106
In pleading practice, some practitioners think that establish-
ing the characters of plaintiff and defendant is so important that
it should be done up front, expanding the traditional identifica-
tion of the parties in the beginning of a complaint into descrip-
tions of them calculated to create sympathy for the plaintiff and
suspicion of the defendant from the first moment.10 7 In commer-
cial litigation, for example,
[i]f the client is a small-business woman . . . a thumbnail
sketch of her business activities should be included. If the
defendant is a large bank, insurance company, manufactur-
er, or publicly traded conglomerate, the size of its operations
and assets are pertinent. Specific descriptions of a particu-
lar enterprise can build empathy for the client and set the
tone for what constitutes commercially reasonable con-
duct.108
When an organization or government entity rather than an
individual is the plaintiff, it too can profitably be given a perso-
nality and characterized likeably at the outset of the complaint,
as in the following description of the National Federation of the
Blind, which goes well beyond the required jurisdictional informa-
tion to create a character with a worthy mission.
105. See Lodge, supra n. 67, at 204.
106. See Cheney, supra n. 94, at 137.
107. See Mahfood, supra n. 25, at 39.
108. Id.
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4. The National Federation of the Blind, the leading national
organization of blind persons, is a not-for-profit corporation
duly organized under the laws of the District of Columbia
with its principal place of business in Baltimore, Maryland..
. . The Federation is widely recognized . . .as a collective
and representative voice on behalf of blind Americans and
their families. The purpose of the NFB is to promote the
general welfare of the blind by (1) assisting the blind in their
efforts to integrate themselves into society on terms of equal-
ity and (2) removing barriers and changing social attitudes,
stereotypes and mistaken beliefs held by sighted and blind
persons concerning the limitations created by blindness that
result in the denial of opportunity to blind persons in vir-
tually every sphere of life .... The NFB and many of its
members have long been actively involved in promoting
adaptive technology for the blind, so that blind persons can
live and work independently in today's technology-
dependent world.... 109
But a lengthy description of a party is not always necessary.
Sometimes a single, well-chosen quotation can establish character
in a complaint. In the involuntary servitude complaint of the
Ethiopian immigrant described earlier, one can "see" the charac-
ter of the defendant, plaintiffs "employer," when the defendant is
quoted as telling plaintiff, "you are my punching bag-the one on
which I can take out my anger and you have nowhere to go."110
Careful research, can also turn up telling statements record-
ed by respected journalists or historians, as in the following ex-
cerpt from a complaint filed by the ACLU in a "forced disappear-
ance" case.
16. In providing its services to the CIA, Jeppesen knew or
reasonably should have known that Plaintiffs would be sub-
jected to forced disappearance, detention, and torture in
countries where such practices are routine. Indeed, accord-
ing to published reports, Jeppesen had actual knowledge of
the consequences of its activities. A former Jeppesen em-
ployee informed The New Yorker magazine that at an inter-
nal company meeting, a senior Jeppesen official stated: 'We
109. Compl. 4, Natl. Fedn. of the Blind, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 1999 WL 33756896
(D. Mass. Nov. 9, 1999).
110. Compl. 47, Chere, No. 2:04-cv-06264-SRC-CCC.
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do all of the extraordinary rendition flights-you know, the
torture flights. Let's face it, some of these flights end up
that way." Jane Mayer, Outsourced: The C.I.A.'s Travel
Agent, The New Yorker, Oct. 30, 2006.111
Here, the quotation effectively counters any competing narrative
Jeppesen may offer. The quotation also helps to establish narra-
tive coherence, showing how the facts and the plaintiffs' stories
comport with each other.
Juxtaposition of quotations is another effective technique for
establishing character, as demonstrated by the contrasting voices
in the following excerpts from a civil rights complaint alleging
racial discrimination. One of the defendants is alleged to have
said, "I'm looking for a good colored leader who can control his
people. Everybody looks for a good black these nowadays. You
find one and you've got liquid gold."112 In contrast, the following
is attributed to the eighty-four-year-old African-American plain-
tiff: "I don't see a bit of difference now than I did way back in '51
or '52 in the civil rights. It hasn't reached us. I reckon it's on its
way, but it ain't got here yet."11 3 The defendant's racism is re-
flected in his suggestion that good African-American men can't be
found and that a leader is good only if he "controls" his people. In
contrast, the plaintiffs statement establishes her patient, long-
suffering character and seems like a reliable, unpretentious
statement of the truth. This kind of juxtaposition helps the draf-
ter to achieve narrative fidelity: the audience is not only con-
vinced that the plaintiffs suffering as a result of racial discrimi-
nation is real, but also desires redress for her injury.
It should be noted by way of caveat, however, that quotes
should ordinarily be used judiciously in complaints-whether to
establish character or for other purposes-and ideally, should be
documented. Defendants will most usually deny uttering the pre-
cise words attributed to them.114 Moreover, since plaintiffs spe-
ill. First Amend. Compl. 16, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 2007 WL 2227631
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007).
112. Eastman, supra n. 5, at 846.
113. Id. at 847.
114. The prevailing wisdom is, of course, that the drafter's first concern should always
be to frame allegations in such a way as to elicit the maximum of admissions. Yet some
practitioners dissent, arguing that defendants will always find a way to deny allegations,
no matter how carefully they are framed, and that "forcing' admissions is just one of the
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cific allegations in a complaint will ordinarily be held to be admis-
sions, quotations should be carefully vetted for unintended conse-
quences. Finally, with the exception of claims that turn on
words-libel, for example-no conscientious drafter would want
to depend entirely on quotations to make out a claim. To do so
could make proof of the claim depend on proof of the utterance. 115
Yet despite these caveats, the drafter should not automatically
rule out using quotations liberally to establish character. Only by
careful analysis of the factual and legal specifics of the case, the
nature of the audience, and the goals the drafter seeks to achieve
with the complaint can the drafter determine whether or how to
use quotes.
Details about plaintiffs' backgrounds can also provide a vivid
and sympathetic picture, as in the following excerpt from a com-
plaint alleging discrimination based on sex-segregation in a mid-
dle school. The details that the drafter chose concerning plain-
tiffs upbringing and avocations do more than just create a likea-
ble character; rather, by challenging gender stereotypes, they re-
late directly to her sex discrimination "story," thus enhancing the
coherence of the narrative.
75. M.S. has grown up with role models that have shown her
that females need not behave according to gender stereo-
types. For instance, both her father and her mother have
served in the military. Both her father and her mother are
volunteer firefighters....
76. M.S. herself has sought out activities that require physi-
cal exertion, strict discipline, performance under stress,
quick decisions, and risk-taking. For instance, she has a
purple belt in Shaolin Kung Fu. She is a certified scuba di-
ver. She is a volunteer firefighter cadet. She is comfortable
interacting with both boys and girls.116
goals of an artfully drafted complaint. See Child, supra n. 38, at 34.
115. For example, a plaintiff suing a landlord for improperly securing the premises
should not have her claim depend upon proving that the landlord said, "I'll fix that lock
when hell freezes over." The addition of the more general allegation that the landlord,
although aware of the faulty lock, failed to have it repaired, would be prudent.
116. Compl. %1 75-76, D.S. ex rel M.S. v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 2006 WL 2705000
(M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2006).
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Still another way to make plaintiff come alive is to allege
thoughts and feelings, including, for example, plaintiffs assess-
ment of defendant's mental state:
[P]laintiff was shocked, stunned, thought he was going to die
right there, and was especially horrified by the deadly threat
to his son. Plaintiff has no idea what was on the guard's
mind, and what was going to happen in the next moment.
The exposure was multiplied by the sudden realization that
the conduct of the defendant Doe 1 "Security guard" was ir-
rational .... 117
Since plaintiffs counsel is rarely privy to defendant's
thoughts and feelings, defendants are inevitably known by their
actions. In the following excerpt from the Ethiopian woman's in-
voluntary servitude complaint mentioned earlier, defendant's ac-
tions are described with a clinical precision and simplicity that
make them all the more chilling and credible. A quotation from
the defendant and a description of the plaintiffs feelings round
out our knowledge of the characters in these skillfully drafted al-
legations.
43. In the fall or winter of 2002, Defendant Taye called Ms.
Chere into his room and ordered her to massage his back,
which he said was sore.
44. Approximately one week later, Defendant Taye again or-
dered Ms. Chere to massage his back but this time he told
her to take off his pajamas and "go lower." He lifted his legs
to touch her breast with his foot. While Ms. Chere massaged
his back, Defendant Taye ejaculated on his blanket. Ms.
Chere was horrified and afraid so she left the room.
45. On four or five subsequent occasions, Defendant Taye
required her to "massage" him in this same manner. Ms.
117. Compl. T 43, Preys v. Downtown L.A. Motors Mercedes, 2004 WL 3184156 (Cal.
Super. July 12, 2004). Contrast this account of plaintiffs thoughts and feelings with the
rote allegation of injuries in another false imprisonment case, Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food
Stores, Inc. -"Plaintiff was embarrassed, afraid, inconvenienced, insulted, mentally dis-
tressed, humiliated, anxious, and he suffered emotionally." Compl. 35, Youngblood v. Hy-
Vee Food Stores, Inc. No. 99-0629-CV-W-2 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1999).
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Chere was unable to refuse because she was frightened of
the Defendants. 118
Sometimes it is hard to make a client likeable. When the
client is a convicted drug-dealer complaining of mistreatment by
law enforcement, one approach might be to "downplay facts about
the client, and instead make him a proxy for an 'ideal,"'11 9 such as
the right to walk the streets unmolested by over-zealous police
officers. Portraying the problem plaintiff as one embroiled in a
"man against self' conflict is another option. For example, a reco-
vering drug addict can be portrayed "as a hapless victim of drugs,
a nemesis that is in essence a character in the case story."120 Sim-
ilar techniques can be used in a civil case, such as a custody bat-
tle, where a father's participation in anger management counters
prior abuse.
However, the pleader's efforts to make the client sympathetic
and the adversary dislikeable should respect the reader's intelli-
gence and capacity for empathy. Judges routinely see through
obvious ploys for sympathy and even "[j]urors readily see through
gratuitous praising of the virtues of the parties."121 There must
be narrative coherence, that is, "a fit between the character of a
person and the relevant conduct of the person."122 Moreover, if
118. Compl. I[ 43-45, Chere, No. 2:04-cv-06264-SRC-CCC.
119. See Foley & Robbins, supra n. 68, at 473.
120. Id. at 474.
121. Gerald Reading Powell, Opening Statements: The Art of Storytelling, 31 Stetson L.
Rev. 89, 94 (2001). It is easy for the zealous advocate to go over the top. A complaint alleg-
ing that a town engaged in a "blunderbuss effort to drive away [an] unwanted residence for
recovering addicts" tries too hard to make the plaintiffs appealing and to demonize the
town. The opening paragraph alleges that the lawsuit
is about a Village's . ..knowing, intentional, and deliberate discrimination
against a protected class of individuals, recovering drug and alcohol addicted
persons seeking nothing more than to reside within a community near to an ad-
diction treatment center. This action seeks ... to redress the egregious and un-
constitutional efforts by the Defendant... to block Plaintiffs' lawful and legally
protected ownership and use of premises.., as a residence .... "
Compl. 1, Woodfield Eq.,L.L.C. v. Village of Patchogue, 2004 WL 2992172 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
24, 2004) (emphasis added). Instead of convincing, the pounding legalese redundancy here
alienates the reader. The qualifier "seeking nothing more than to reside" is particularly
unsuccessful, in that it suggests that the reader might otherwise unfairly suspect plain-
tiffs' motives.
122. Powell, supra n. 121, at 94.
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the pleader tells a credible and individualized tale of conflict and
disjunction, the reader does not need to believe the plaintiff is a
paragon of virtue in order to feel that he deserves to be made
whole. None of the readers of a complaint, not the judge, not even
the adversary's counsel, could believe that it is right to throw a
convicted drug dealer on the ground and stomp on his head.
3. Point of View
"Point of view concerns through whose eyes the reader views
the action."123 Artful exploitation of point of view is essential to
effective storytelling. Fiction writers sometimes use omniscient
narrators whose account of events the reader is intended to take
as true. Sometimes the point of view is' that of one character,
whether told in the first-person or a third- (or even second-) per-
son narrative. In other stories, point of view alternates among
several characters, all with their own complementary or conflict-
ing versions of events. In still other stories, point of view is subtly
manipulated so that the reader comes to see that the narrator is
unreliable and that the facts may well be other than as the narra-
tor describes them.124 In short, point of view is intricately bound
up with credibility or its absence.
In traditional complaints, the attorney is the narrator, telling
plaintiffs story from a lawyer's point of view. (The introductory
clause reinforces this, e.g., "Plaintiff Peter Pi, represented by his
attorney, Alma Alpha, makes the following allegations against
defendant David Delta.") The voice is unmistakably that of a
lawyer, and at best, the uninflected, unemotional language pro-
duces an appearance of objectivity that enhances credibility. Yet,
thoughtlessly done, this point of view merely distances the reader
from the narrative and induces her to withhold judgment as to
the truth of the matter.
123. See Cheney, supra n. 94, at 119-120.
124. Omniscient narrators are prevalent in the works of Jane Austen, Charles Dickens,
and George Eliot. See, for example, Pride and Prejudice, Bleak House, and Middlemarch.
Ford Maddox Ford's The Good Soldier is a fine example of a first-person narrative, as is
Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy. Point of view shifts in the novels of Henry James,
e.g., Wings of a Dove or The Golden Bowl, where competing interpretations of events are
manifold. Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day is an excellent example of an unrelia-
ble narrator.
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The allegations in a more artful complaint comprise a third-
person narrative told from the plaintiffs point of view and told, if
not in the plaintiffs own voice, at least, in a voice the plaintiff can
recognize. The reader sees what plaintiff saw, hears what plain-
tiff heard, and feels what plaintiff felt. In order to persuade,
however, the drafter must convince the reader that the plaintiff is
a reliable source, that his or her "take" on events, reflected in the
lawyer's theory of the case, has narrative coherence. The drafter
does that, first of all, by creating an individual and positive cha-
racter for the plaintiff, using the techniques noted above, and by
careful use of detail and tone, especially diction. 125 The plaintiffs
story must also be supported with verifiable facts if the reader is
to believe "this really happened" the way the plaintiff says.
For example, in the following allegations describing how a
noise complaint escalated into a violent encounter between police
and plaintiffs, the drafter shows us the event from plaintiffs'
perspective, successfully creating narrative coherence through the
use of verifiable details. Despite one plaintiffs explanation that
he had long since turned down the volume, the police pushed into
the apartment. When the plaintiff tried to write down the badge
numbers of the officers,
Mr. Caraballo's nephew Jose Anthony Montolio (a minor)
was grabbed by the arm and neck by Officer Bolte. Jose An-
thony Montolio was then slammed face-first onto the floor by
Officer Bolte, and jumped on by other officers who kneed
him in the back and forcefully pulled his arm up to his
shoulders. Clariluz Caraballo, the mother of Jose Anthony
Montolio, was peppersprayed by Officer Bolte when she ran
toward her son asking Officer Bolte to release him. Clariluz
Caraballo was grabbed and arrested by officers when she at-
tempted to get to the bathroom to wash out the pepper
spray .... Mr Caraballo, Clariluz Caraballo, Jose Montolio
and the stereo were taken to the 46th Precinct. Ms. Cara-
ballo's eyes were treated by EMS for the harm caused by the
pepper spray. 126
125. See infra pt. II(B)(6) (discussing 'Tone").
126. Compl. IM 28-34, Caraballo v. City of N.Y., 2005 WL 1803399 (S.D.N.Y. May 2005)
(paragraph numbers omitted).
[Vol. 15
Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice
Given the large cast of characters and the specific details given in
this account, the mayhem described seems entirely credible.
(Mentioning that the stereo was taken to the 46th Precinct along
with the plaintiffs was an especially nice touch.)
This account would have been less credible had a less able
drafter qualified the specifics of the narrative, as too many do,
with the disclaimer "on information and belief." This formulation
is rarely necessary, since there is no requirement that pleadings
be made on personal knowledge. By signing the complaint, the
attorney warrants only that there is a good faith basis for its alle-
gations. Although appropriate only in affidavits, "on information
and belief' is too often sprinkled on complaints like magic dust,
where it has only the effect of distancing the reader from the
narrative by suggesting that the facts are not necessarily as
represented.127
4. Setting a Scene
"A scene makes the past present."128  It lets the reader see
the event unfold, and this can be very effective in a complaint. For
example, in the forced-disappearance case mentioned earlier, one
alleged terrorist "was kept in near permanent darkness. His cell
was pitch black for twenty-three hours a day. There was a bucket
in the corner for a toilet, but it was difficult to use in the dark
without spilling the contents over his only blanket." 129  This de-
scription succeeds through its evocation of visual (darkness), tac-
tile (feeling around in the darkness, cold enough to need a blan-
ket), and olfactory (the spilled bucket) phenomena. In a similar
example from the involuntary servitude complaint,
Ms. Chere was required to sleep on a thin mat on the floor in
Kaleb's room throughout the length of her employment.
During the last nine months of this period, no rug covered
127. The phrase is only appropriate when the complaint is "verified," that is, the truth
of the allegations is sworn to by the plaintiff, thus converting the complaint in effect into
an affidavit. Some courts require verification by the plaintiff when particular claims are
raised, for example, defamation. Plaintiff also often has the option of verifying the com-
plaint. The advantage of verification for the plaintiff is that the defendant must then
verify the answer and is thus exposed to the penalties of perjury.
128. See Cheney, supra n. 94, at 54.
129. Compl. 78, Mohamed, 2007 WL 2227631.
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the hardwood floors on which she slept. Every night, Ms.
Chere rolled out her mat and covered herself with the gabi
(light blanket) she had brought with her from Ethiopia, be-
cause Defendants did not provide other bedding. Each
morning she was required to roll up the mat and put it
away. 130
But a case need not be extraordinary to set a scene well, as in
the following excerpt from a garden-variety slip-and-fall case.
4. On March 5, 2002, plaintiff was on the campus of Haskell
Indian Nation University in Lawrence, Kansas, when she
slipped and fell on clear ice or packed snow on a sidewalk.
The snowy ice she slipped on was relatively clear and color-
less and was in a location where it was shaded by a building
most of the day. Therefore, it was not readily noticeable to
the plaintiff or those similarly situated walking towards that
area.
5. Snow on all of the sidewalks not located in the shade of
the building had melted or been cleared at the time plaintiff
fell.
6. The packed snow or ice had not been cleared from the si-
dewalk despite the fact that the precipitation that resulted
in the accumulation of icy snow on the sidewalk, had stopped
a few days previously.13 1
We see the scene as we imagine the plaintiff saw it, and we are
inclined to believe that she slipped on almost invisible ice that
defendant had inexcusably neglected to remove.
5. Detail
Detail is crucial to effective narration. Details elicit emotion,
create mental pictures, stimulate associations, and lend coherence
and fidelity to narratives. "If the selection of event and detail is
good, it won't need much commentary from the author to show
130. Compl. 35, Chere, No. 2:04-cv-06264-SRC-CCC.
131. Compl. IM 4-6, Arkeketa v. U.S., 2004 WL 2007234 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2004). The
skillful scene-setting here is in sharp contrast to the boilerplate allegations of the bare-
bones slip-and-fall complaint reproduced as Appendix A.
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what it means."132 There is no rule of thumb about how much de-
tail to use. "Sometimes a litany of details will be effective in their
cumulative power; sometimes a single detail will suffice; other
times, the best method is to weave the details into the description
or the narratives as they come up, logically." 133
In a complaint, the decision to use just a single, telling detail,
several details, or even elaborate detail, is dictated for the drafter
by the intersection of the reasonably certain facts with the claims
asserted, the audience, and the goals the complaint is intended to
achieve. This is not always an easy decision.
A practitioner who has a client who tells a credible and com-
pelling tale of wrongdoing and injury, a story that cries out to be
told, may nonetheless conclude that the judge's known hostility to
anything but the dry bones of a case makes it imprudent to file a
complaint that details the allegations in a way that truly allows
the plaintiff to be heard. Similarly, a practitioner who does not
wish to trigger the mandatory disclosure provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) or who wishes broad discovery will
do best not to allege with particularity facts likely to be dis-
puted-although the drafter should be sure to bear in mind the
countervailing consideration that disclosure will be triggered for
the defendant as well. Facts that have the ring of truth but which
cannot be verified, or even investigated, should likewise be omit-
ted, for fear of invoking Rule 11 or its state analogues. 134 Moreo-
ver, minutely detailed allegations run the risk of minute inaccu-
racies and are likely to elicit only denials. In short,
[t]o change the story through a happy ending, we need to
win. That means omitting from our thicker pleadings facts
we may not be able to prove. It means omitting facts we pre-
fer to conceal until the most strategic time .... We may sa-
crifice creativity in situations where translation matters less
than persuasion, and persuasion may demand resort to
plainer language. For some audiences (in some cases, on
132. See Cheney, supra n. 94, at 52.
133. Id. at 39.
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; e.g. Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2008).
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some occasions), we aim ... to persuade by ordinariness in-
stead of outrage. 135
Fortunately, a single descriptive detail can have enormous
impact. For example, the allegations in an age and disability dis-
crimination complaint against a restaurant recount how a middle-
aged woman who had undergone a mastectomy was told a new
uniform policy required her to wear one of two bathing suit tops.
She "tried on the tops in the restroom and was dismayed to see
that her surgical scars were visible from various angles."136 The
single detail that it was in the restaurant restroom that she tried
on the tops, rather than in the privacy and comfort of her home,
lends poignancy and vividness to the story. The reader can see
her standing there and sense her misery as she watches herself in
the mirror. Simply noting that "she tried on the tops and was
dismayed to see . . ." would not have been nearly so effective. A
telling detail, like a single telling quote, can be extremely effec-
tive.
But whether the drafter chooses a single detail or many, the
important thing is to choose details that not only capture the es-
sence of the person, place, or event, but that also establish narra-
tive coherence and fidelity. In the sex discrimination complaint
mentioned earlier, plaintiffs claim gains strength as the drafter
provides a litany of quotes from psychological works, one more
ridiculous than the next, that the defendants relied upon to justi-
fy sex-segregated classrooms.
58. In Why Gender Matters, Dr. Sax [one of the school's ex-
perts] explains that because of sex differences in the brain,
girls need real world applications to understand math, while
boys naturally understand math theory. For instance, girls
understand number theory better when they can count
flower petals or segments [sic] of artichokes to make the
theory concrete.
135. Eastman, supra n. 5, at 858.
136. Compl. 12, EEOC v. Mears Marina Assoc. L.P., 2007 WL 3124273 (D. Md. Sept.
20, 2007). This complaint is reproduced as Appendix C to this Article.
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62. In Why Gender Matters, Dr Sax explains that "anomal-
ous males"-boys who like to read, who don't enjoy competi-
tive sports or rough-and-tumble play, and who don't have a
lot of close male friends-should be firmly disciplined,
should spend as much time as possible with "normal males,"
and should be made to play competitive sports.
70. In The Action Guide, Mr. Gurian [another of the school's
experts] explains that when young male elephants are
brought up without parents, they begin killing rhinoceroses
and trying to mate inappropriately, until alpha male ele-
phants are introduced into their group. Mr. Gurian con-
cludes that "alphas" must be brought in to manage students
seeking to dominate.137
The cumulative effect of absurd, even sinister, gender stereotyp-
ing comes from both the type and number of details. The image of
rows of girls sitting at their desks, artichokes before them, count-
ing leaves is so unexpected, but so laughable, that a school's re-
liance on this authority elicits wonderment. The analogy between
young teenage boys and orphan male elephants killing rhinoce-
roses and (in a phrase heavy with innuendo) "mating inappro-
priately" until set straight by "alpha" males is also bizarrely
laughable. More disturbing, however, is the image of "anomalous
males" who prefer reading to rough-housing and need to be "dis-
ciplined" and subjected to the enforced company of "normal
males." Here, the drafter uses the technique of the telling quote
within the technique of massed details. The quotation marks
around "anomalous males" and "normal males" makes clear that
this is the language of the school's expert, Dr. Sax. The number
and selection of details in this complaint make the school's rea-
sons for single-sex education seem no more than bizarre pretexts
for sex discrimination, effectively reinforcing the credibility of
plaintiffs story.
The drafter who, after analyzing the case in the context of
audience and purpose, chooses to make highly detailed, "thicker,"
allegations faces yet another tactical and stylistic choice: whether
137. Compl. IN 58, 62, 70, Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. 2006 WL 2705000.
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to allege details in many separate paragraphs, or to aggregate
them in longer paragraphs. In notice-pleading jurisdictions, Fed-
eral Rule 10(b) and its state analogues require only that "so far as
possible" the contents of each numbered paragraph be limited to a
"single set of circumstances,"' 138 giving the drafter much latitude
in this respect. At the extremes, a drumbeat of paragraphs each
containing one short sentence and a fugue of long paragraphs
would seem inappropriate to most stories-yet in rare cases, even
those techniques are appropriate. For example, where repeated
acts of physical abuse are alleged, describing each blow and each
injury in its own paragraph can be effective. In contrast, some
cases may lend themselves to longer paragraphs of detail, for ex-
ample a civil rights claim painting the historical background to a
claim of racial discrimination. The prevailing wisdom is that pa-
ragraphs should be quite short, for readability and in order to
make denial harder.139 Certainly, as a "default" strategy, this
makes sense, but a more individualized strategy that finds the
rhythms of the particular story and varies the paragraph lengths
to suit will produce a more readable and effective narrative.
6. Tone
All the techniques discussed thus far help a writer to create
tone. For example, we can hear outrage or sincerity in a quote
and catch irony in the juxtaposition of events. Yet diction-word
choice-is perhaps the best way of conveying tone. And poor word
choice-empty legalese, redundant synonyms, tired verbs-can
spoil the narrative's effect and destroy credibility, even though
the complaint otherwise has a sympathetically drawn plaintiff,
graphic action, and telling details.
The following paragraph is from a complaint alleging that the
eighty-three-year-old complainant was brutalized and trauma-
tized when police burst into her apartment in the middle of the
night based only on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip alleging
that drugs were sold from that address.
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
139. As noted above, there are dissenting voices on this issue, practitioners who believe
that defendants will always find a way to deny allegations, no matter how short and pre-
cise. See Child, supra n. 38, at 34.
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44. The Plaintiff suffered serious and severe psychological
and physical trauma, mental anguish and emotional dis-
tress, humiliation and embarrassment, bruises and contu-
sions to her face, legs, back and upper torso, soreness to her
legs, back and upper torso, aches and pains, chest pains, de-
hydration and low blood sugar, including the loss of her in-
dependence and her ability to participate in the activities of
daily living, the loss of her ability to ambulate without assis-
tance, persistent fear, inability to sleep, inability to eat,
nervousness, anxiety and exacerbation of a pre-existing
heart condition, diabetes and arthritis. 140
This is an example of the "thinness" of traditional legal rhetoric
that James Boyd White and Herbert Eastman deplore. 141 The
tone is overly insistent, yet lifeless and unconvincing. The read-
er's reaction is, "Well, yes, that's lawyer talk all right; might be
true, or it might not." The plaintiff herself is entirely out of the
frame. The litany of redundant pairs-"serious and severe,"
"mental anguish and emotional distress," "humiliation and em-
barrassment," "bruises and contusions"-turn the allegations into
a lifeless ritual. The pretentious Latinate diction--"ambulate
without assistance" for "walk without help," for example-also
keeps plaintiffs injuries conjectural.
These allegations could easily have been given a more credi-
ble tone and one more faithful to plaintiffs story.
The midnight "no-knock" entry by the police into her home
was physically and mentally traumatic for Ms. Kirkland. It
left her with bruises over much of her body. It also left her
so terrified that she did not eat, sleep, or leave her apart-
ment for a week, becoming dehydrated and confused. Her
diabetes and heart condition also worsened as a conse-
quence, and she is no longer able to live on her own or to
walk without using a walker.
This simple account told in words the plaintiff can understand
tells the story credibly from her point of view, conveying her expe-
rience with an immediacy entirely lacking in the legalese version.
140. Compl. 44, Kirkland v. City of New York, 2007 WL 1853785 (E.D.N.Y. May 25,
2007).
141. See e.g. supra n. 32.
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Often one word can set the tone of a complaint. Verbs are
particularly useful. In one false imprisonment complaint, the
plaintiff alleges that she was "handcuffed and paraded back and
forth in the Mall."142 Not "walked." Not "taken through" the
Mall. But "paraded": put on public display and humiliated. Simi-
larly, in the "forced disappearance" complaint, one alleged terror-
ist "was stripped[] [and] diapered."143  His mortification is cap-
tured in the second verb.
Adjectives, though discouraged in many legal writing texts,
can be put to good effect in a complaint. One of our clinical col-
leagues tells the story of a complaint drafted by her students in a
prisoners' rights case. The plaintiffs complained of the conditions
of their pre-trial detention in a local jail. Among other allega-
tions, the complaint alleged that the air in the facility was "malo-
dorous." Our colleague was convinced that it was the addition of
that single adjective that lifted it above the ordinary pro se in-
mate complaint and helped it to survive a motion to dismiss.
Finally, punctuation helps to create tone. When a store "loss
prevention" guard (a job description noteworthy for its own point-
of-view) "barks" (a vivid verb) at a suspected shoplifter, "Go up
the stairs! I said go! I said move!" the reiteration and exclama-
tion marks convey the bullying hostility. 144
These, then, are some of the techniques that can be used to
transform a complaint, even one in a garden-variety civil case,
from a generic "stock story" into a narrative that carries the read-
er along from the introductory clause to a plea for redress that
appears logically entailed. Such a complaint can incline the judge
to believe that events transpired as related; it will almost certain-
ly create respect for the drafter and induce opposing counsel "to
be afraid, very afraid" of plaintiffs story. Form-book complaints
achieve none of this. Thus practitioners and law students have
every interest in mastering the basic narrative techniques that
turn a complaint into a persuasive rhetorical tool.
142. Compl. 22, Allen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1998 WL 34325365 (W.D.N.C. Dec.
1, 1998).
143. Compl. 10, Mohamed, 2007 WL 2227631.
144. Compl. 23, Madden v. Home Depot, 2006 WL 1306365 (D. Haw. Mar. 17, 2006).
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III. [REILEARNING THE LANGUAGE OF NARRATIVE
In order to represent our clients not just acceptably, but ful-
ly-that is credibly, artfully, authentically-we need not only to
learn how narrative works, but also, to relearn the language of
storytelling. Understanding the rhetorical force of narrative, re-
cognizing storytelling techniques, and developing a vocabulary for
describing them-the focus of the preceding sections-is just the
beginning. The most difficult part of the process lies in accepting
the uncomfortable truth that the syllogistic analysis and "objec-
tive" language we absorbed in law school, which for many of us all
too quickly became our first language, 145 is not the only discourse
we need to use as practitioners and teachers, "and that others
may more fully translate the reality of clients and persuasively
advance the legal argument .. ".."146 So the first step in our re-
education is to remind ourselves how far we have traveled as pro-
fessional writers and of the return trip we must make before we
can claim not just competence, but true mastery of the dis-
course.
147
145. Our own experience as teachers has shown that by the second year of law school,
many students have already developed a resistance to telling stories. We often assign an
exercise in which we ask our upper-class students to draft an affidavit for a divorced
mother petitioning for permission to move out-of-state with her minor child. A simulated
interview with the "client" gives them a compelling story to work with. Some students
frame the client's request unhelpfully in generalities and conclusions of law, as though
afraid they might be giving something away or behaving unprofessionally by telling the
judge their client's story.
146. Eastman, supra n. 5, at n. 453.
147. One good way to begin the return trip is to read Ruthann Robson's article Notes
from a Difficult Case, in In Fact: The Best of Creative Nonfiction 226 (Lee Gutkind ed.,
Norton 2005). This essay chronicles Robson's ordeal when she was misdiagnosed with
terminal cancer. In the essay, she shuttles between medical discourse, legal discourse, and
personal experience. What makes this essay so instructive is watching Robson translate
her experiences into different discourses. We were directed to this article by Andrea
McArdle, who suggests that law teachers assign it to help students understand how and
when to speak with a personal voice in the law. Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in
Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal
Voice, 12 Clin. L. Rev. 501 (2006). This skill "presupposes an ability to understand and
then reframe formal language, an ability that novice legal writers are still developing....
especially law students ... [who] are still struggling to make legal language a part of their
'lexicon."' Id. at 534. To this same end, Herbert Eastman suggests using a famous civil
rights case to sensitize students in a simulation pre-trial practice course to the complexity
of clients' real-life stories. Students begin by reading and briefing a casebook version of
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Students are then exposed to the real-
life context of the case by watching a portion of the PBS television documentary, "Eyes on
the Prize," focusing on Martin Luther King Jr.'s campaign to desegregate Birmingham.
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Another important step in the process is to become a close
and critical reader of pleadings, analyzing how they succeed-or
fail-as narratives. The Appendices to this Article reproduce
three complaints-a pair of slip-and-fall complaints, Breeden v.
Hilton Hotels148  and Bork v. Yale Club,149 and an age-
discrimination complaint, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm.
v. Mears Marina Associates, L.LP.15 The two slip-and-fall com-
plaints, both filed in federal court, are in sharp contrast one to
another. The Breeden complaint seems straight from a notice-
pleading form-book while the Bork complaint makes plaintiffs
tumble from a speaker's dais almost filmic in its narrative impact.
The third complaint, Mears Marina, is an example of narrative
pleading at its very best, a complaint that has correspondence,
coherence, and fidelity.
We offer the following narrative analyses as sample readings.
They are indeed, samples, not models, and by no means exhaust
the potential lessons to be drawn from these complaints. It is in
the nature of narrative that our take on it varies with the life ex-
perience we bring to it.
A. Bare-bones "Slip-and-Fall"
The bare-bones complaint in Breeden never goes beyond the
"stock story" level; it has the correspondence to the basic negli-
gence schema that conforms it to the minimal requirements of
Rule 8, but it has little else. The drafter makes no attempt at
character development, providing only jurisdictional informa-
tion-"The plaintiff, MARY SUE BREEDEN, is a resident citizen
of Morgan County, Alabama. . . ."151-and the conclusory generic
description "business invitee. '' 152 There is similarly no attempt to
set a scene. The only visual detail in the entire complaint is "a
dangerous condition in the form of water on a tiled surface."153
See Eastman, supra n. 5 at n. 453 (crediting David B. Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King,
Walker v. City of Birmingham, and the Letter from a Birmingham Jail, 26 U. Cal. Davis L.
Rev. 791 (1993)).
148. See Breeden v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 2004 WL 3054743 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2004).
149. See Bork v. Yale Club, 2007 WL 1686504 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2007).
150. See EEOC v. Mears Marina Assoc. L.P., 2007 WL 3124273 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2007).
151. App. A, at 4.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id. at 1 11.
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The reader's expectation of finding out where this water was
(public restroom? pool area? bathroom? lobby?) is frustrated, and
narrative coherence suffers. As to the action of the story, we
learn only that the plaintiff "was caused to slip and fall, and to
incur.., injuries and damages."154 She "incurred hospital, doctor
and medical expenses, and suffered physical pain, permanent dis-
ability and impairment, and mental anguish."155 But because
Breeden's actual injury, pain, impairment, and disability and
their impact on her life remain abstract, the reader's sympathy is
not engaged, and the reader has no opinion about the truth of the
accident and injury allegations.
Moreover, her story is told from the lawyer's point of view in
language both verbose and generic, replete with redundancy and
legalese: "at all times relevant hereto,"156 "exercised control,
maintenance, supervision, and/or management," 157 "aforesaid." 158
The narrator appears remote from the story, unconversant with
its details, neutral as to its truth or falsity.
In brief, the complaint entirely lacks narrative coherence and
fidelity-unnecessarily so, since it is difficult to see how context
could require a complaint this bare. Although the incident took
place at a hotel in Egypt, surely some verifiable facts could have
been provided about the plaintiff, about the location of the slip-
pery tile, and about plaintiffs injury and disability, without re-
quiring expensive investigation or incurring tactical disadvan-
tage.
B. "Slip-and-Fall" as Narrative
In contrast, the Bork slip-and-fall complaint goes beyond the
stock story to tell an individual tale that is surprisingly compel-
ling and credible, despite its familiarity. Character development
begins with the identification of the parties:
2. Plaintiff Robert H. Bork is a resident and citizen of Vir-
ginia. He was injured while visiting the Yale Club in New
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 12.
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York, New York, to give a speech at an event there on June
6, 2006.159
Even if the reader never heard of Bork's controversial nomination
to the Supreme Court, the paragraph introduces the plaintiff as a
figure of enough gravitas to be a speaker at an event at an elite
venue. Moreover, unlike Mary Sue Breeden in the previous com-
plaint, he remains an individual throughout--"Mr. Bork," not
"plaintiff."
The factual allegations are detailed; the scene is carefully set.
7. The New Criterion hosted the event in a banquet room at
the Yale Club. As the host of the event, the Yale Club pro-
vided tables and chairs where guests could sit during the re-
ception and the evening's speeches. At the front of the room,
the Yale Club provided a dais, atop which stood a lectern for
speakers to address the audience.
8. Because of the height of this dais, the Yale Club's normal
practice is to provide a set of stairs between the floor and the
dais. At the New Criterion event, however, the Yale Club
failed to provide any steps between the floor and the dais.
Nor did the Yale Club provide a handrail or any other rea-
sonable support feature to assist guests attempting to climb
the dais. 160
With the banquet room visualized, the narrative commences
with the incident that disrupted the steady state. The reader is
put at the scene: "When it was his turn to deliver remarks to the
'audience, Mr. Bork approached the dais."'161 But because there
was no support, "Mr. Bork fell backwards as he attempted to
mount the dais, striking his left leg on the side of the dais and
striking his head on a heat register."'162 The reader sees him fall-
ing, as though in slow motion.
The aftermath of this incident is vividly depicted. The plain-
tiff developed a 'large hematoma" that "burst" (a forceful verb)
and required "surgery, extended medical treatment, and months
159. App. B, at 2.
160. Id. at %% 7-8.
161. Id. at T 9.
162. Id.
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of physical therapy."163  He experienced "excruciating pain."164
Because it is the only emotionally charged adjective in the com-
plaint, "excruciating" is effective. The injury's effects are spelled
out: it kept him "immobile," interfered with "his typical schedule,"
and "weakened Mr. Bork's legs so that he still requires a cane...
[and] continues to have a limp."165 All his efforts to return to the
steady state he enjoyed before his injury are as yet unrealized.
Although Mr. Bork is clearly able to understand traditional
legal discourse, his attorneys wisely chose to retranslate his story
into everyday language that makes this stock slip-and-fall indi-
vidual and real.166 Possessed of all the characteristics that create
narrative rationality, it is a credible story.
C. A Well-Told Tale
Underlying the complaint in E.E.O.C. v. Mears Marina is the
explicit stock script of "cancer survivor." 167 The term evokes the
scenario of a fighter trying to rise above the trauma of life-
threatening illness, mastectomy scars, and hair loss. 168 This
script is combined with another prototypical story, that of the
"loyal employee" and the "sexist boss from hell" who uses unlaw-
ful employment practices to rid himself of a middle-aged conva-
lescent whose appearance he deems detrimental to business. 169
The scripts resonate with the reader, establishing narrative cor-
respondence. Life experience makes it easy to believe that an
employer would rather hire an attractive young waitress than
retain a battle-scarred cancer survivor.
The narrative rationality of this story is further enhanced by
storytelling techniques. Ms. Finley is not a prototype but a per-
son earnestly trying to resume her livelihood and her life. She
assures her supervisor she has "been building up her strength in
163. Id. at V 10.
164. Id. at % 11.
165. Id.
166. See supra n. 147 (discussing an article by Professor Ruthann Robson and explain-
ing her use of different types of discourses to describe her ordeal after being misdiagnosed
with terminal cancer).
167. App. C, at7T1.
168. See id. at IM 8-9, 14, 16.
169. Seeid. at 10-11, 15-16
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preparation for the season."170 The drafter's choice of words-she
"was sure that she could handle it"-reveals a distinctive individ-
ual voice.171
In addition to being conscientious, Ms. Finlay is fair-minded:
she does not want to believe that her employer is discriminating
against her and does everything she can to comply with demands
that (in a narrative tour de force) the reader is led to find unac-
ceptable even before she does. Despite suffering hair loss as a
result of chemotherapy, she agrees to comply with the new "no
hat" rule-although this must have been distressing. In a re-
strained but deft choice of adjective, she is merely "taken ab-
ack"-not "appalled," "devastated," or "outraged."172
In a finely set scene using spare but telling details, she game-
ly tries on the restaurant's swimsuit tops in the facility's re-
stroom: but this proves too much-the tops expose her surgical
scars "from various angles," and she urges her supervisor to re-
consider-albeit unsuccessfully. 17 3 These carefully chosen details
about Ms. Finley and her plucky attempts to comply with man-
agement's punitive dress codes are so skillfully individualized
that her story is both real and moving.
In contrast, Ms. Finley's supervisor appears to be a weasel.
We know him only through his actions, but that is sufficient. Un-
moved by Ms. Finley's reassurances that she is able to perform
her duties, he imposes a series of obstacles intended to discourage
her. The "no hat" and "swim suit top" rules target her post-
treatment appearance in the most humiliating way.174  That
these policies are scams masking discriminatory animus becomes
even more apparent when he rehires a younger woman who re-
fuses to comply with them, but he never returns Ms. Finley's
calls.1 75 Through the use of character development, tone, detail,
and point of view, narrative coherence, correspondence, and fidel-
ity coalesce in this complaint.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1 10.
173. Id. at IM 12-13.
174. Id. at M 10-11.
175. Id. at 15-19.
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The final step in the [re]learning process is to take the plunge
and start telling stories in our pleadings, honing our skills case-
by-case as we learn to adapt narrative development to audience
and purpose. For many practitioners, and even law students, sto-
rytelling is a childhood language buried under the successive dis-
courses that adulthood imposes, most totally by traditional legal
discourse. Indeed, in time, this comes to seem the only language
at a practitioner's disposal. But to serve our clients well, we law-
yers must become bilingual and [re]learn the language of narra-
tive.
IV CONCLUSION
By their nature, the pleadings in a civil action tell stories, but
too often the stories are buried, barely discernible stock scripts,
"thin" discourse mired in legalese. Such pleadings are missed
opportunities for the advocate, not only because this is the plain-
tiffs first, and perhaps only, opportunity to tell her story, but also
because readers-judges included' 1 6-instinctively look for stories
when they read, and credible stories have great rhetorical power.
Thus, we have tried in this Article to show how traditional
narrative techniques can be used to enhance all complaints, not
just those telling extraordinary tales. Whether litigating a civil
rights, sexual harassment, negligence, or contract claim, a lawyer
ought to be able to tell a story that engages and convinces the
reader-a story that has the narrative rationality that comes
from the presence of correspondence, coherence, and fidelity. We
have also attempted to show how specific techniques such as cha-
racter development and detail can be used in complaints to
achieve narrative rationality. Sometimes, as in the story of the
Ethiopian woman lured into domestic slavery, the tale cries out
for a full panoply of narrative techniques. At other times-as in
the story of Ms. Finley, the cancer survivor-a few well chosen
176. Judge Patricia Wald writes, "[Jiudges react negatively to the 'gotcha' lawsuit....
based on some technical nonobservance of a law or regulation where consequences are
undocumented .... We judges want to know the facts, the real-life conditions, the actual
practices underlying a legal challenge .... Judges search for meaning in what we do. You
need to convince us that the law or the regulation is important in poor people's lives." See
Eastman, supra n. 5, at 771 (third set of ellipses in original) (citing Patricia M. Wald, Ten
Admonitions for Legal Services Advocates Contemplating Federal Litigation, Clearing-
house Rev. 11, 13 (May 1993)).
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techniques quietly, but effectively, convey the plaintiffs expe-
rience. In addition, we have endeavored to show that narrative is
not simply a persuasive tool or a literary enhancement, but has
tactical advantages as well. It can, for example, trigger or forec-
lose immediate disclosure, or narrow or broaden discovery. Thus,
we have tried to harmonize instrumentality with the narrative
aspect of pleadings. Finally, we have made an effort to provide
some practical guidance on the [re]learning that is necessary if we
are to restore narrative to its central place in pleading practice.
In short, we have tried to show that pleadings are narrative
and can and should be artfully drafted. However, because the
contextual variables are so numerous-jurisdiction, court, judge,
adversary, plaintiff, defendant, and claim are just the begin-
ning-it is difficult to come to a single resolution and coda here.
What we can do is aspire to positive transformation.
Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice
APPENDIX A: BARE-BONES "SLIP-AND-FALL"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
NORTHERN DISTRICT, ALABAMA
MARY SUE BREEDEN,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
V.
HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation; et al.
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff MARY SUE BREEDEN hereby complains of the de-
fendants HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION, a Delaware corpo-
ration, [and other named defendants] .... The claims, actions and
causes of actions [sic] described herein arise out of a March 21,
2002, injury event occurring in Alexandria, Egypt.
JURISDICTION
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
4. The plaintiff, MARY SUE BREEDEN, is a resident citizen
of Morgan County, Alabama, residing at 2805 Lexington Avenue,
SW, Decatur, Morgan County, Alabama 35603.
5. Defendant HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION is a Dela-
ware corporation whose principal place of business is located in
the State of California (hereinafter "HILTON HOTELS")-
2009]
The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute
HILTON HOTELS, however, conducts business in at least two
locations within the Northern District of Alabama.
FACTS
9. On March 21, 2002, the plaintiff was a business invitee on
the premises of the Hilton Borg El Arab Resort, Matrouh Desert
Road, Borg El Arab, Egypt, in or near Alexandria, Egypt (herei-
nafter, "the Premises").
10. At all times relevant hereto, . . . [the Defendants] were
the owners of; through their agents, the possessors of; and other-
wise through such agents and employees, exercised control, main-
tenance, supervision and/or management over the Premises.
11. On March 21, 2002, the Defendants negligently and/or
wantonly caused, permitted, allowed, or created a dangerous con-
dition to exist on the Premises in the form of water on a tiled sur-
face over which pedestrian traffic was allowed. The Defendants
had actual notice and/or had constructive notice of this condition
and/or failed to exercise reasonable care with respect to their
maintenance of the Premises, thereby negligently and/or wanton-
ly failing to discover and remove this condition.
12. As a proximate consequence of the aforesaid negligence
and/or wantonness, the plaintiff was caused to slip and fall, and
to incur the following injuries and damages:
She sustained personal injury, incurred hospital, doctor and
medical expenses, and suffered physical pain, permanent disabili-
ty and impairment, and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE,... the plaintiff MARY SUE BREEDEN de-
mands judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in
the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($500,000.00), plus costs.
*€ *¢ *
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APPENDIX B: "SLIP-AND-FALL" AS NARRATIVE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTICT OF NEW YORK
ROBERT H. BORK,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
V.
THE YALE CLUB OF NEW YORK CITY,:
Defendants.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is a personal injury action brought against Defendant
Yale Club of New York City (the "Yale Club") for its negligent and
grossly negligent failure to maintain reasonably safe facilities.
PARTIES
2. Plaintiff Robert H. Bork is a resident and citizen of Virgin-
ia. He was injured while visiting the Yale Club in New York,
New York, to give a speech at an event there on June 6, 2006.
3. Defendant Yale Club of New York City is a private club
with its principal place of business at 50 Vanderbilt Avenue, New
York, New York 10017. The Yale Club offers guestrooms, restau-
rants, athletic, banquet and meeting facilities for its members
and their guests.
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VENUE AND JURISDICTION
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6. On the evening of June 6, 2006, the New Criterion maga-
zine held an event (the "New Criterion event") at the Yale Club.
The New Criterion invited Mr. Bork, among other guests, to de-
liver remarks at the event.
7. The New Criterion hosted the event in a banquet room at
the Yale Club. As the host of the event, the Yale Club provided
tables and chairs where guests could sit during the reception and
the evening's speeches. At the front of the room, the Yale Club
provided a dais, atop which stood a lectern for speakers to address
the audience.
8. Because of the height of this dais, the Yale Club's normal
practice is to provide a set of stairs between the floor and the dais.
At the New Criterion event, however, the Yale Club failed to pro-
vide any steps between the floor and the dais. Nor did the Yale
Club provide a handrail or any other reasonable support feature
to assist guests attempting to climb the dais.
9. When it was his turn to deliver remarks to the audience,
Mr. Bork approached the dais. Because of the unreasonable
height of the dais, without stairs or a handrail, Mr. Bork fell
backwards as he attempted to mount the dais, striking his left leg
on the side of the dais and striking his head on a heat register.
10. As a result of the fall, a large hematoma formed on Mr.
Bork's lower left leg, which later burst. The injury required sur-
gery, extended medical treatment, and months of physical thera-
py.
11. Mr. Bork suffered excruciating pain as a result of this in-
jury and was largely immobile during the months in which he
received physical therapy, preventing him from working his typi-
cal schedule before the injury. The months of relative inactivity
weakened Mr. Bork's legs so that he still requires a cane for sta-
bility. In addition, Mr. Bork continues to have a limp as a result
of this injury.
[Vol. 15
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
[Negligence]
12. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 11 of
this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
13. The Yale Club had a duty to provide reasonably safe fa-
cilities in its reception and meeting rooms, including providing a
safe dais of reasonable height and with stairs between the floor
and the dais and a supporting hand-rail.
14. At the New Criterion event, the Yale Club breached its
duty to provide reasonably safe facilities by failing to provide a
safe dais and stairs between the floor and the dais, a supporting
handrail, or any other reasonable support feature to protect its
guests attempting to mount that dais.
15. It was reasonably foreseeable that, by failing to provide a
safe dais and stairs between the floor and the dais, a supporting
handrail, or any other reasonable support feature, a guest such as
Mr. Bork attending the New. Criterion even would be injured
while attempting to mount the dais.
16. The Yale Club's negligent failure to provide reasonably
safe facilities, and in particular, its failure to provide a safe dais
and stairs between the floor and the dais, a supporting handrail,
or any other reasonable support feature to protect its guests at-
tempting to mount the dais, caused Mr. Bork to fall while at-
tempting to mount the dais and caused his extensive and continu-
ing injuries.
17. As a result of the Yale Club's negligence in failing to pro-
vide reasonably safe facilities, Mr. Bork has suffered actual dam-
ages. These damages include pain and suffering, a continuing leg
injury, medical bills and related costs of treatment, and lost work
time and income. The long-term effects of his injuries continue to
manifest themselves.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
[Gross Negligence]
18. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 11 of
this Complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
19. The Yale Club had a duty to provide reasonably safe fa-
cilities in its reception and meeting rooms, including providing a
safe dais of reasonable height and with stairs between the floor
and the dais and a supporting handrail.
20. The Yale Club breached its duty to provide reasonably
safe facilities by wantonly, willfully, and recklessly failing to pro-
vide a safe dais and stairs between the floor and the dais, a sup-
porting handrail, or any other reasonable support feature to pro-
tect its guests attempting to mount that dais.
21. It was reasonably foreseeable that, by failing to provide a
safe dais and stairs between the floor and the dais, a supporting
handrail, or any other reasonable support feature, a guest such as
Mr. Bork attending the New Criterion event would be injured
while attempting to mount the dais.
22. The Yale Club's wanton, willful and reckless disregard
for the safety of its guests, and in particular, its failure to provide
a safe dais and stairs between the floor and the dais, a supporting
handrail, or any other reasonable support feature to protect its
guests attempting to mount the dais, caused Mr. Bork to fall
while attempting to mount the dais and caused his extensive and
continuing injuries.
23. As a result of the Yale Club's gross negligence and wan-
ton, willful and reckless disregard for the safety of its guests, Mr.
Bork has suffered actual damages. These damages include pain
and suffering, a continuing leg injury, medical bills and related
costs of treatment, and lost work time and income. The long-term
effects of his injuries continue to manifest themselves.
24. Because the Yale Club's gross negligence was wanton,
willful and in reckless disregard for the safety of its guests, puni-
tive damages should also be awarded against it in an amount to
be determined at trial.
* * *
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief against
Defendant:
A. Awarding actual damages resulting from Defendant's
wrongdoing in excess of $1,000,000.
B. Punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
C. Pre- and post-judgment costs, interest and attorney's
fees;
D. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem ap-
propriate and equitable.
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APPENDIX C: A WELL-TOLD TALE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMN.,
Plaintiff,
v. : COMPLAINT
MEARS MARINA ASSOCIATES LIMITED:
PARTNERSHIP d/b/a Red Eye's Dock Bar,
Defendant,
Margaret Finley, Intervener,
Introductory Matters
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has previously brought an action under Title I and Title
V of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to correct unlaw-
ful employment practices on the basis of disability and retaliation
and to provide appropriate relief to Margaret Finley ("Ms. Fin-
ley"), a 55-year-old breast cancer survivor, who was adversely af-
fected by such practices.
2. In addition to being adversely affected by defendant's viola-
tions of the ADA, Ms. Finley was subjected to illegal discrimina-
tion and termination on the basis of her age in violation of the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). As a
result of the illegal discrimination, Ms. Finley brings this action
for all of the foregoing and to seek the full measure of relief pro-
vided for under the ADEA, including but not limited to double
damages for defendant's willful actions.
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3. The causes of action which form the basis of this matter
arise under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA").
4. The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 626.
5.Venue is proper in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
Factual Allegations
7. Ms. Finley was a seasonal employee at the Red Eye's Dock
Bar beginning in 1995, working as a bartender.
8. Ms. Finley was diagnosed with breast cancer and under-
went treatment, including surgery, chemotherapy and radiation,
in 2005, causing her to miss the entire 2005 season.
9. In May, 2006, Ms. Finley sought to return to work as she
had in the past. Robert Wilson, ("Wilson") her direct supervisor,
expressed concern that she would not be able to perform her job
duties. Ms. Finley assured him that she had been building up her
strength in preparation for the season and was sure that she
could handle it.
10. Wilson also informed Ms. Finley that there was a new
policy prohibiting employees from wearing hats. In the past, Ms.
Finley and others had been allowed to wear hats at work. Ms.
Finley, who had lost all of her hair as a result of her chemothera-
py and radiation, was taken aback by this new rule, but complied.
11. On or about June 24, 2006, the assistant manager told
Ms. Finley that there was a new uniform policy in effect, and
handed her two bathing suit tops. Up to that point, Red Eyes
bartenders had worn shorts and a Red Eyes' T-shirt or sweatshirt,
depending on the weather.
12. Ms. Finley tried on the tops in the restroom and was
dismayed to see that her surgical scars were visible from various
angles.
13. Ms. Finley put her Red Eyes' T-shirt back on and ex-
plained why she could not wear the top. She was sent home for
refusing to wear the new "uniform."
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14. Ms. Finley returned to work the next day, certain that
management would reconsider making her wear a top that ex-
posed her surgical scars. Ms. Finley offered to wear something
under the top, or alter the top with additional material to provide
proper coverage. Wilson refused and ordered that Ms. Finley and
another employee, Tiffin Lilly, who also objected to wearing the
bathing suit top, be fired immediately and escorted from the pre-
mises.
15. Two days later, Ms. Lilly was called back to work, and
was told that the new bathing suit top would be optional, not
mandatory.
16. Ms. Finley was never called to return to work. When she
called Red Eyes to see if she, too, could have her job back, her
calls were not returned.
17. Ms. Finley was 54 years old at the time of her termina-
tion.
18. Tiffin Lilly is substantially younger than Ms. Finley, and
is believed to be in her mid-twenties.
19. Ms. Finley's age was a motivating factor in connection
with Defendant's termination and failure to rehire Ms. Finley.
20. Upon information and belief, Defendant has a pattern
and practice of discriminating against older women.
21. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful,
improper, and discriminatory conduct, Ms. Finley has incurred
and continues to incur, a loss of earnings and/or earning capacity,
loss of benefits, pain and suffering, humiliation, and mental an-
guish, and has incurred attorney's fees and costs associated with
bringing this claim.
22. Defendant's conduct, as set forth above, was willful, in-
tentional and outrageous under the circumstances.
COUNT I
23. Plaintiff-Intervener incorporates by reference all of the
above paragraphs as if set forth herein in their entirety.
24. By committing the foregoing acts of discrimination
against Ms. Finley, Defendant has violated the ADEA.
25. Said acts were intentional and warrant the imposition of
liquidated damages.
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26. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's viola-
tion of the ADEA, Ms. Finley has sustained the injuries, damages
and losses set forth herein and has incurred attorneys' fees and
costs associated with bringing this claim.
27. Ms. Finley is now suffering and will continue to suffer ir-
reparable injury and monetary damages as a result of Defen-
dant's discriminatory and unlawful acts unless and until this
Court grants the relief requested herein.
Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Intervener respectfully requests
that this Court enter judgment in her favor and against Defen-
dant:
a) declaring the acts and practices complained of herein to be
in violation of the ADEA;
b)enjoining and restraining permanently the violations al-
leged herein;
c) awarding compensatory damages to make Plain-
tiff-Intervener whole for all past and future lost earnings,
benefits and earnings capacity which Plaintiff-Intervener
has suffered and will continue to suffer as a result of De-
fendant's discriminatory and unlawful conduct;
d) awarding liquidated damages to Plaintiff-Intervener;
e) awarding Plaintiff-Intervener costs of this action, together
with reasonable attorney's fees;
f) awarding Plaintiff-Intervener such other damages as are
appropriate under the ADEA; and
g) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems
appropriate.
"* *
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